

85¢ a Copy • No Advertising • \$7 a Year

Philips University Library
Enid, Oklahoma

10 NOV 1960

10-60 ROM 1
PHILIPS UNIVERSITY
PO BOX 2036
UNIVERSITY STATION
ENID OKLA

Current History

NOVEMBER, 1960

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

Russia and Continuing Coexistence

THE KHRUSHCHEV POLITY	<i>Julian Towster</i>	257
RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENT	<i>Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr.</i>	262
KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY	<i>Hans Kohn</i>	267
RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND COEXISTENCE	<i>Michael T. Florinsky</i>	270
SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP	<i>Robert Loring Allen</i>	275
UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION?	<i>Solomon M. Schwarz</i>	280
KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL CHANGES	<i>Alvin Z. Rubinstein</i>	285
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK		291
CURRENT DOCUMENTS		
Khrushchev Speaks at the United Nations, September, 1960		296
THE MONTH IN REVIEW		306

Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times

Published by
Current History, Inc.

Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

NOVEMBER, 1960
Volume 39 Number 231

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editor:
JOAN L. BARKON
Promotion Consultant:
MARY A. MEEHAN

•
Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES
University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY
Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Columbia University

HANS W. GATZKE
The Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER
University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN
Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ
University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY
Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE
All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN
Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE
University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE
Amherst College

Book Review Editor:
ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
University of Pennsylvania

85 cents a copy: 7 dollars a
year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-
five cents a year. Foreign in-
cluding the Philippines 7 dol-
lars seventy-five cents a year.

Coming Next Month...

CHINA AND CONTINUING COEXISTENCE

December, 1960

Our December, 1960, issue continues CURRENT HISTORY's three-part study of competitive coexistence and the cold war. In this issue, six authorities on the Red Chinese government appraise and evaluate the Chinese Communists present and potential world posture. Articles include:

THE FAILURE OF THE MOSCOW-PEKING ALLIANCE by *G. F. Hudson*, Director of Far Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford University; and author of *Europe and China: Their Relations in History to 1800*;

CHINA AND THE TWO GREAT POWERS by *Werner Levi*, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, and author of *Modern China's Foreign Policy*;

CHINESE TRADE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA by *Amry Vandenbosch*, Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky, and co-author of *Southeast Asia among the Powers*;

INDUSTRIALIZATION UNDER CHINESE COMMUNISM by *Yuan-li Wu*, Director of the Institute for Asian Studies, Marquette University, and co-author of *China, Its People, Its Culture, Its Society*;

AGRICULTURE IN THE CHINESE COMMUNES by *Chao Kuo-chun*, Visiting Professor and Head of the East Asia Department, Indian School of International Studies, Delhi University, and author of *Agrarian Policies of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1959*; and

THE STRENGTH OF THE RED CHINESE ARMY by *Allan S. Nanes*, Assistant to the Deputy Director, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1960, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 39

NOVEMBER, 1960

No. 231

How strong is Russia today? Is it probable that competitive coexistence rather than war will characterize the next decade? "Yes," say most of the contributors to this study. "The next ten years may . . . earn the designation of the decade of trials and tribulations," as our introductory article points out, but it is likely that for the Russians coexistence, as Khrushchev himself has put it, "has become a real fact, and . . . an imperative necessity for all states."

The Khrushchev Polity

By JULIAN TOWSTER

Professor of Political Science, University of California

THE SUDDEN and spectacular collapse of the Paris summit meeting, preceded as it was by a series of changes at the top level of the Soviet hierarchy, has evoked a wide range of speculation abroad concerning critical internal difficulties in the U.S.S.R. and a fundamental deterioration of Khrushchev's position of leadership. Invariably these discussions have raised the more serious question of possible reflections in the foreign arena that would dangerously undermine the chances for continued coexistence. While the dramatic *volte face* in Soviet demeanor in mid-May has perhaps made such speculations unavoidable, there is no evidence to suggest a basic weakening of the Khrushchev regime, nor any present determination on its part to call for the verdict of total war in resolving the East-West conflict.

Foreign estimates of current weaknesses in the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. have revolved around problems of the socio-economic structure and popular morale, focusing particularly on such recent events as the reported Temir Tau uprising by youths in October, 1959, the harvest failure in Kazakhstan and Siberia, disgruntlement among demobilized army officers following the January decree concerning their release,

and the personnel shifts at the Party and government summits last May.

There is no question that the shipment of young people to new industrial sites in the East often ill-prepared to receive them—as was the case with the reputed revolt in the Karaganda industrial complex—has been attended with recurring difficulties. But the industrial picture as a whole shows sustained progress, with over a thousand new major enterprises put into operation in 1959, very substantial increases in capital goods output, and a series of concerted measures inaugurated to speed up the development of the food and consumer goods industries. The deficit in gross grain yield in 1959 (by 16 million metric tons as compared with 1958), and especially the fall in grain deliveries from Kazakhstan, must have been a particularly bitter pill for the Soviet leaders to swallow, in view of such Khrushchev incentives as the transfer of the machine-tractor stations to the kolkhozes in December, 1958, and the marked rises in farm prices and peasant incomes. But there is no definite proof at this stage that the Kazakhstan virgin lands program is a hopeless failure. And since the above deficits were due not only to drought in many regions but to inadequate prepara-

tions for the harvest, the Soviet leaders believe—as the discussions and the shelving of the proposed kolkhozes councils at the December Central Committee Plenum show—that stricter Party supervision and control will remedy the situation.

Officer Displacement

On the face of it, a more serious problem is posed by the demobilization of officer cadres from the air force and navy. The displacement of a quarter of a million officers under the January law scheduling a reduction of the armed forces by 1.2 million by the autumn of 1961 will undoubtedly add to the reservoir of discontent engendered within sections of the intelligentsia by the earlier administrative, economic and educational reorganizations; it has given rise to renewed speculations concerning the weight of the army and its leaders in the internal balance of power.

But this event cannot be viewed in a vacuum. In terms of the relative strength and weakness of the Khrushchev regime, it can only be properly evaluated within the over-all context of the bold social upheaval which is being wrought by the Khrushchev reforms and its total impact on popular morale. If there was one common denominator in the yearnings of the harassed populace under Stalin, it was the craving of all segments of the citizenry for economic betterment and some relief from the harshnesses of the regime. While the liberalizing moves of the post-Stalin regime in the sphere of protection of citizens rights still leave much to be desired,¹ it is to Khrushchev's credit that he has made determined efforts to meet the welfare needs of the citizenry by a host of measures designed to secure a steady rise in the standard of living and greater equality of opportunities for social advancement.²

Thus, as compared with the last year of Stalin's rule—1953—the budget for education has risen by 33 billion rubles by 1959, the outlay for health has nearly doubled (44 billion rubles) and the expenditures for social security have increased more than three and

a half times (from 22.8 billion rubles to 88.2 billion rubles). Tuition fees in schools and universities were abolished in 1956. The average rate of pensions was increased by over 80 per cent, with the new scale granting lower-paid workers pensions equivalent to 100 per cent of earnings. The work week will have decreased to 41 hours by the end of this year, and at the Twenty-first Party Congress in January, 1959, Khrushchev promised a standard 40 hour week by 1962. Also, the 1940 decree providing strict penalties for lateness, absenteeism and job quitting was revoked in 1957.

Most important of all from the standpoint of mass sentiments, the trend toward maximum wage differentials inaugurated by Stalin in 1931—and sometimes resulting in a 40 to 1 ratio of differences between high and low earnings—has now been reversed. High salaries are reported to have been cut. Under the Seven Year Plan the minimum wage now standing at 300–350 rubles a month will rise to 400–450 rubles by 1962 and to 500–600 rubles in 1963–1965. Housing construction has increased threefold and further increases along all these lines, as well as consumer goods and social services, are scheduled under the Seven Year Plan. The educational reform, with its insistence on practical production experience both prior to and in the course of the educational process, and its new rules on admission, examinations and scholarships in the higher schools, will enhance educational opportunities for lower income groups.

Lastly, along with a return to democratic semantics and some increased initiative at the local levels of government, one must note such changes in the legal sphere as the curtailment of the sway of the secret police, the reform of the forced labor camps, and the revision of the criminal codes, to allow some amelioration in the administration of justice. These tangible improvements—in place of Stalin's psychological pies in the sky—carry a tremendous appeal for the broad masses of the populace.

It is in the light of this panorama of change, with its distinct imprint of incipient levelling in the steep class differentiation, that the demobilized officers' discontent must be assessed. For Khrushchev has not only

¹ See Julian Towster, "Law and Government in the U.S.S.R.," *Hastings Law Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 3, February, 1960.

² See the illuminating article by Alex Nove, "Social Welfare in the U.S.S.R.," *Problems of Communism*, January–February, 1960, on which the figures given below are largely based.

tied his reforms to demands for raising labor productivity, but has accompanied them at every step with thundering moral exhortations against passivity and careerism in the Party, smugness and corruption among officialdom and general favoritism among heretofore pampered segments of the population. One such long-pampered child has been the army. And aside from providing some ameliorative measures for the retraining and relocation of the demobilized officers, Khrushchev knows that no more popular tears will be shed over their plight than were shed earlier over the displaced economic managers and administrators.

The Reshuffle at the Summits

Nor need Khrushchev fear any serious threat from the high command of the armed forces on this account or because of the removals from their position of Marshal Konev as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces and of Marshal Sokolovsky as chief of the general staff and first deputy minister of defense. To begin with, the Soviet Army has never been an independent political force. With over three fourths of its ranks affiliated with the Party by 1955, it has been steadfastly forged over the past four decades into an obedient tool of the Party summit. As regards its top leadership, efforts have been made in the post-Stalin period to rehabilitate the names of military leaders purged in 1937–1938 and to rewrite the war annals so as to recognize the merits of the marshals. Yet the brief tenure of Zhukov in the Party summit, the infusion of a “party spirit” in the army following his easy ouster in November, 1957, and the reemphasis on the Party’s exploits in the war, testify to the successful reassertion of the Party’s primacy.

Zhukov’s removal was in fact a return to an old organizational principle that—to guard against Bonapartism—no real military man must occupy a place at the highest seat of power, the Party Presidium. As has been pointed out on an earlier occasion,³ at least three factors would work against a unified opposition in the high command *vis-à-vis* the Party leadership: (1) the officer cadres are carefully chosen and continuously indoctrinated; (2) no binding sense of class solidar-

ity is allowed to develop among the commanders; and (3) the Party leadership skillfully employs the principle of *divide and rule*, utilizing personality and opinion differences and especially the powers of appointment, removal and promotion to this end.

Perfect illustrations of the latter are the tactics of the Zhukov ouster and recent transfers, as well as the elevation of 12 generals to the rank of marshal in 1955 and Khrushchev’s promotion of 300 officers to the rank of general this spring. Six higher officers—four of them active marshals (Konev, Malinovsky, Moskalenko, Sokolovsky)—are full members, and twelve higher officers (nine active) are candidate members in the Central Committee of the Party. As such they are entitled, and probably even expected, to express their opinions in discussions of policies directly affecting military structure and potential.

It is very likely that the changes in the top command are connected with such expressions with regard to the recent military cuts and certain tactical moves in behalf of “peaceful coexistence” deemed deleterious to the Soviet military posture. But, as in the past, the very facility of these changes serves to confirm the cardinal fact of the supremacy of the Party leadership in the Soviet system of power.

What the May alterations in that leadership connote in terms of Khrushchev’s position is an intimately related question. The evidence available to date suggests neither the interpretation that the reshuffle is proof positive of “singular concentration of personal power” in Khrushchev’s hands nor the opposite view that “collective leadership has returned.” The truth lies somewhere in between. The changes entailed a contraction of the Party Presidium from 24 to 20 by ousting from it three members (Belyaev, Aristov and Kirichenko—the last two also from the Secretariat) and the reduction of the ten man Party Secretariat to six by releasing in addition Madame Furtseva and Nikolai Ignatov to assume the posts of minister of culture and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers respectively. At the same time, Party Presidium member Brezhnev replaced Voroshilov as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, while Frol Kozlov, who was Khrushchev’s first deputy chairman in

³ See Julian Towster, “Changing Russian Politics,” *Current History*, January, 1958, p. 3.

the Council of Ministers, was transferred to the Secretariat. Kozlov's position on the Council of Ministers was assigned to Kosygin—a Politburo member under Stalin in 1952 who had to earn his spurs again under Khrushchev since 1957.

There is nothing in these changes to suggest a diminution of Khrushchev's authority. Interpretations that they subordinate "Khrushchev's locus of power—the Secretariat" to the Party Presidium, or that now "the extraordinary situation" has arisen wherein Brezhnev, the formal head of state, "becomes a direct subordinate of Khrushchev, the head of Government," convey false conceptions concerning the nature of the constellation of power in the U.S.S.R. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev has a hard core of trusted lieutenants in the Party Presidium, whose other assignments are shifted around from time to time to crucial sectors of the polity to meet particular needs. At the present this hard core comprises at least 8 or 9 out of the 14 Presidium members, while 5 of the 6 candidates are entirely Khrushchev appointees. All of the reassigned remain members of the Party Presidium and the reshuffle is in fact a tightening operation placing the most able co-workers in spots of great current importance (over-all economic supervision, agriculture, technological and scientific development, culture and so on). There is nothing extraordinary about Brezhnev's added assignment. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is merely an implementing arm of the Party Presidium, and its successive heads have always been subordinate to the highest Party leader: Kalinin, Shvernik and Voroshilov to Stalin, and later Voroshilov and Brezhnev to Khrushchev.

None of this, however, signifies that Khrushchev has already attained the height of Stalin's personal rule. He is as yet neither a personal dictator backed by a personal machine and endowed with a charismatic aura of infallibility, nor a simple member of a team of absolute equals. Rather, he is a powerful manager of the controlling power nucleus who must still pay heed to strong higher echelon sentiments and expert technical opinion as they reveal themselves in Presidium deliberations and Central Committee discussions.

It is too early to speak about an "accumulated force of the Khrushchev cult." While he has exhibited great organizing ability and shrewd judgment, Khrushchev has yet to demonstrate the kind of prophetic insight which is the mainstay of charismatic authority. As compared with the endless hosannas to Stalin, the tributes to Khrushchev after the last Party Congress are feeble, recently balanced in part at least by references in the highest journals to the values of Lenin's principle of collectivity in Party leadership. Without Stalin's methods of terror and exclusive power concentration, only continued successes over a long time may yield Khrushchev the attributes of charisma. The Party Central Committee—emasculated by Stalin who killed off 70 per cent of its members in the great purges—is now meeting regularly and has become again a locus of high level Party discussions, and *on occasion* even an arbiter on policy differences when complete unity of viewpoint is lacking in the Presidium.

Thus, despite Khrushchev's ability—as First Secretary—periodically to introduce followers into the Central Committee membership, there are some metes and bounds to his rule at present. In the absence of unlimited personal prerogative in Khrushchev, his lieutenants must repeatedly undergo the test of leadership, and inevitably policy failures or new tasks, no less than major differences within the ruling team, find expression in shifts in positions. There is no reliable proof, however, of the emergence of an organized anti-Khrushchev faction at the summits, nor any other evidence to indicate a basic alteration in his position of leadership.

Conclusions

In sum, from the standpoint of growing material strength, popular morale and political stability, the Khrushchev regime exhibits no fatal fissures at present. It is neither a David nor a Goliath. If Soviet post-Paris utterances—expressing the anger of a leader and people whose sense of national dignity and impregnability had been outraged by the U-2 admissions—have not been followed by dangerous showdowns, it is because now more than ever Soviet foreign policy reflects the domestic scene. Essentially it rests on

four considerations: the need for time for Khrushchev's economic program; the popular desire for peace; a genuine belief that total war would cost the U.S.S.R. its Communist hegemony if not its very existence; and a tactical design to suit the emerging decade.

In terms of posture this design mirrors Khrushchev's belief that the Soviet Union must evolve into an even stronger Goliath. In terms of changing policy, Khrushchev senses the need for the U.S.S.R. to play a David, not only through sheer strength, but through cunning, artifice and daring to overtake the Goliath of the West, the United States, and to check the rising giant of the East, Mao's China. Hence the Russian approach will continue to be zig-zag, flux and contradictory demeanor, a tactic of probes and threats, alternately or simultaneously employing gestures of conciliation and methods of brinkmanship. In this total context, coexistence is not a "policy" but an accepted inescapable reality epitomized in Khrushchev's statement of March 25, 1960: "Given the present balance of power and the level reached by military technology, peaceful co-

existence has become a real fact, and alongside this, an imperative necessity for all states." But competition by all and sundry means, far more than cooperation, will give the tone to coexistence. The next ten years may, therefore, well earn the designation of "the decade of trials and tribulations."

Julian Towster visited the Soviet Union in 1935 and again in the summer of 1957, when he spent some time also in Poland and Czechoslovakia. During World War II, he served as a political analyst with the Department of Justice, the Office of Strategic Services and the Department of State. Later Professor Towster became Chief of the Foreign Political Section of the East European branch in the Office of Research and Intelligence, Department of State. He taught at the University of Chicago from 1947 to 1949. He is author of *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.* and co-author of *European Political Systems*.

"Man 'limited by his nature' is 'infinite in his desires.' The world is thus full of opposing forces. Of course, human wisdom has often succeeded in preventing these rivalries from degenerating into murderous conflicts. But the competition of efforts is the condition of life. Our country finds itself confronted today with this law of the species, as it has been for 2,000 years. The division of the peoples that inhabit Europe and North America is the main fact and the worst evil of our time. Two camps are set up, face to face, under conditions such that it depends solely on Moscow or Washington whether or not a large part of humanity is wiped out in a few hours.

"In the face of such a situation, France deems that there is no territorial disagreement or ideological dispute that has any importance by comparison with the necessity of exorcising this monstrous peril. In France's view, this situation implies three conditions.

"The first is a detente, in other words the bettering of international relations, putting a stop to provocative actions and speeches and increasing trade, cultural exchanges and the visits of tourists in order that a more peaceful atmosphere might be created. . . .

"The second condition is a specific degree of controlled disarmament, preferably aimed at the devices capable of carrying bombs to strategic distances, in order that the possibility—and, at the same time—the temptation suddenly to provoke general destruction might vanish.

"The third condition is a beginning of organized cooperation between East and West devoted to the service of man, either by helping in the progress of underdeveloped peoples or by collaborating in the great projects of scientific research, on which depends the future of all."

—Charles de Gaulle, *President of the French Republic*, May 31, 1960.

One of the many things which makes it difficult . . . to understand the Russians is that there is a serious lag in Soviet strategic thinking. "Their thinking," writes this military analyst, "is several years behind ours." "The Russians may, however, have one great advantage in the future, their devotion to basic research."

Russian Military Development

By EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR.
Consultant to the United States Air Force

THE common measure is always one's self, one's culture. Standards are self-generated and then imposed as judgment on the behavior of others. The result, in military affairs, is a dangerous distortion of perspective in an area in which true sophistication is a prerequisite for survival. Self-evident as this is, United States elites—college presidents, ambassadors, generals, civilian secretaries—have constantly seen the U.S.S.R. in the bent mirrors of their own minds. Time has proved this. The question is why has it taken so long for focus to become sharp enough so that decision-makers begin to respond to reality? Or is focus still blurred?

At the end of World War II when U.S. troops met those of the U.S.S.R., the former were astonished by the diversity of the latter's equipment, its simplicity and even its shoddi-

ness. What impressed them was the lack of motor transport, the fact that artillery caissons were still horse drawn. American officers and men were negatively impressed, whereas they should have been positively astonished that Soviet troops were there at all.

Immediately after World War II, United States elites made errors in judgment, which have a preposterous quality in the clear light of hindsight. President James B. Conant of Harvard University and the former President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Vannevar Bush, both assured the country, for example, that the intellectual climate of the Soviet Union was not conducive to original research. General Walter Bedell Smith returned from his tour as ambassador in Moscow to assert, both privately and in public, his conviction that whereas the Russians might be able to produce a bomb, they could never produce bombs in quantity. Because these thoughts were soothing to the national ego, they were accepted unchallenged.

Indeed, the extent to which the United States vision was distorted—particularly with respect to the development of atomic energy—was disclosed recently in a remarkable book by Arnold Kramish on *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*. Kramish has shown that Soviet developments in the nuclear field were not classified. On the contrary, the essential facts were public for all who had eyes to see.

What has been true of Soviet progress in the field of nuclear energy has likewise been true of both aircraft development and missile research, and engineering. In the matter of

Edward L. Katzenbach has served as Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. From 1955 to 1958 he served as Director of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University. Subsequently he was executive secretary for the National Academy of Sciences on Poseidon (a study of the impact of technology on the future of the United States Navy). He is the author of numerous articles on politico-military affairs for magazines and scholarly journals. This article was written before he began his present assignment with the air force.

Soviet aircraft development, two antipodal mistakes were made in United States estimates. The first was that Soviet planes would never have characteristics comparable to those of the United States and Great Britain. Secondly, once it was recognized that the Soviets had great abilities in both airframe and jet engine design, it was thought that the Soviet planners would never have the courage to cut production on bombers in favor of an all-out effort on missiles.

Two examples will illustrate the point. Shortly before the Korean War, photographs taken of the Mig-15 were considered "fakes" in the higher echelons of the Pentagon. These proved to be, however, the planes which only the superior training of United States pilots kept from being a major danger to our forces in Korea. Later, in the early 1950's, the U.S.S.R. developed a heavy bomber the jet thrust of which surprised and even dumbfounded United States jet-engine designers. Intelligence estimates as to future Soviet bomber production showed that the U.S.S.R. could hardly afford not to press such an obviously fine plane into production, so the argument went. But the Soviets never capitalized on the design. Instead they cut back on production, apparently deciding that the bomber-phase could be bypassed in favor of an expanded ICBM, or Intercontinental Ballistic Missile program.

In the past, most of United States mistakes have been the simple by-product of United States conceit. This has been the case with other nations in the past: the Trojans who would not be warned by the groans and rattling which was heard inside the Greek Horse; Louis Napoleon who refused to countenance the reports of his own military attachés; the Turks, who refused to believe in the possibility of an invasion of Gallipoli during World War I despite, or perhaps in this case because of, the debates on the subject in Parliament. History is filled with evidence of the inability of decision-makers to credit strategic intelligence.

The reasons for our errors have been similar. United States decision-makers, so often industrialists themselves, forgot that high standards in *quantity* production do not necessarily mean high standards in *quality* production. Men such as Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson or Secretary of Defense

Charles E. Wilson should have remembered that, in point of fact, an economy of disposables such as ours—toilet tissues, paper bags, mass-produced clothing and short-lived automobiles—pleasant as it is, does not necessarily guarantee proper attention to major innovations in a technological revolution. But they did not. Hence, life with the U.S.S.R. has been one disagreeable surprise after another.

Perhaps the nationalism which so clouded our vision in the past no longer exists in the fields of production, pure and applied science. Perhaps it is presently accepted that the Russians are a nation of considerable genius, with an almost neurotic drive for superiority which follows at times from a deep sense of inferiority. However much may be said against the U.S.S.R. from a political standpoint, this should not be confused with what must be said of Communist passion for excellence in a variety of endeavors as diversified as the decathlon and space technology. Perhaps United States decision-makers have learned that respect and admiration are multifaceted qualities. We still have not learned, however, the curious convolutions of Soviet thinking as these apply to military thought.

Russian Military Thought

True, everyone in United States society can mouth phrases as to Soviet conspiracy, infiltration and uninhibited subordination of means to ends. But understanding seems to stop on this level. The Soviets, on another level, are credited with thinking like the American military on military subjects, on the use of weapons, on tactics and on strategy. Indeed, United States scholars, both military and civilian, have fallen into one of the oldest of all military errors. They have fought red forces against blue forces in classical terms, as though both thought and acted in the same way. One of the basic, and most blatantly obvious errors, has been that United States strategists have frequently forgotten that the Russians do not necessarily think like Americans.

Take two major Western trends in strategic thought—graduated deterrence and limited nuclear war. The former was first put forward in the mid-1950's by the British Admiral Anthony Buzzard. The latter was

most provocatively raised to the level of a concept by Henry A. Kissinger.

The concept of graduated deterrence held that the best policy for the West was to be prepared to stand-off the Soviet Union—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a megaton nuclear explosive for a megaton, kiloton of atomic power for a kiloton, a pound of high explosive for a pound of high explosive. The gist of the idea was that a given objective was worth a given price and that world tensions would be eased if each side tested the other's price by slowly raising the ante until at a given level one side desisted.

Dr. Kissinger, a latter-day Hegelian strategist, believed that since war with high explosives was out of date, and war with megaton weapons was unthinkable horrible, it might be possible to fight a new kind of war, a war using mid-range kiloton weapons, i.e., those from one-quarter to 20 kilotons (the size dropped on Hiroshima) or larger. This thesis the United States Army adopted immediately and with enthusiasm.

But one point the enthusiasts failed to note immediately. Both the doctrine of graduated deterrence and that of limited nuclear war demanded Soviet cooperation for their fulfillment. This much was thoughtfully admitted. Yet there is no evidence that the Soviet military have even evidenced the slightest interest in nominal, small, nuclear bombs or small atomic weapons systems. Apparently, they have developed weapons and theory around the two extremities of modern warfare: high explosives and megatons. To limited nuclear war they have never given a moment's thought. In short, United States doctrine has not always been based on the realities of Russian strategy, but rather on a forgetful version of a hoped-for response.

There is, then, an obvious problem, and a real psychological block to trying to prognosticate the future of Soviet weapons and Soviet technology—particularly since the U.S.S.R. has made so many unpredictable decisions. Why was it that immediately after World War II, the U.S.S.R. did not reduce the size of its armies in view of a) United States possession of the atomic bomb and b) its own desperate need to rebuild its devastated country? Why did the U.S.S.R. decide to invest in naval cruisers, and a very large

destroyer force? Were these built for prestige alone? Under what conceivable circumstances could there be a military use for such weapons as these? Why did the U.S.S.R. decide to cease building its submarine fleet above some 450 submarines of various classes? Is the Soviet Navy in the process of preparing a fast shift to a nuclear underseas fleet?

In short, just as the Soviet military must spend uncomfortable hours wondering about the military usefulness of some of the weapons systems on which we have spent billions, so our military has spent baffling and essentially fruitless hours wondering why the U.S.S.R. has gone down seemingly blind alleys.

There are, however, a certain number of presumptions about the future of Soviet technology about which there is a reasonable certainty. Between 1963 and 1965, the U.S.S.R. will be a rather greater threat than in the second half of the decade of the 1960's. During this period of time we will not have a sufficiently large number of Polaris (a 1000-mile-plus missile shot from underwater) submarines to be a definitive deterrent to a Soviet first strike. Nor will we have a significant force of mobile and hardened long-range land-based missiles to give adequate redundancy to our deterrent forces.

During these crucial years, the Russians will possess enough long-range nuclear-headed missiles to be a grave threat not only to our overseas retaliatory base structure—which is becoming increasingly obsolete each passing month—but to the continental United States bases as well. General Thomas F. Power, Chief of the Strategic Air Command, testified recently, for example, that 300 Soviet missiles could destroy an unacceptable number of our long-range bomber force—our B-52's—unless a number of these were kept off the ground, i.e., were kept on airborne alert. A number of upward of 300 Soviet ICBM's is a modest expectation. This will be supplemented by a short-range, perhaps 500-mile, missile capability aboard Soviet submarines. In the advent of nuclear war these could be used against the very large number of bases close to the Atlantic and Pacific, against Presque Isle, Otis, Norfolk, Jacksonville, Bremerton, Long Beach, and so on.

Towards 1970, one could expect the Soviets to have a land-based long-range missile arsenal of several thousand "birds" supplemented by a significantly more sophisticated submarine based missile capability. There are, nevertheless, certain aspects of Soviet missile weapons systems which have not been published in publicly available literature. To judge from past experience, this means that it is probably unknown in the classified literature as well.

Missile Capability

One can not say whether or not the Soviets are going to make their missiles hard, i.e., buried and revetted, and/or mobile. Perhaps they expect to achieve security against the United States-instigated war which they mention so frequently by multiplying the numbers of targets which the United States would have to strike against. Perhaps they do not believe the United States really will strike first and hence do not need to guard against this eventuality. Or, perhaps, they simply have not thought of making their weapons less vulnerable to destruction. In view of the fact that this only occurred to United States thinkers a short while ago, one should not rule this out as a possibility. This is particularly true inasmuch as the Soviets doubtless are no less hopeful of a major breakthrough in missile defense than are United States planners.

Second, Soviet planners do not seem as interested as do United States planners in what the latter refer to as systems redundancy, which is to say the maintenance of a number of different weapons systems each of which is capable of destroying a major proportion of another system's primary targets. In the United States, besides Polaris, hardened and mobile Minute Man, still in the developmental stage, air-to-ground missiles, and a variety of other systems are under scrutiny, if not under development, so that if one weapon is rendered ineffective by an as yet unknown counter-measure, another system will be ready to play its role. The Russians seem content with a multiplicity of ground-to-ground long-range missiles, plus some submarine-based missiles. If they have prepared themselves to produce more complex and different systems they have kept it

very much to themselves—much more so, indeed, than one would believe possible from past experience.

There is evidence that the Russians believe that there is a continuing need for a ready force to fight a high explosive war, like that of World War II. Since the end of World War II they have continued developing a number of weapons in which the United States is only marginally interested. They have developed more sophisticated tanks, tactical missile launchers, better artillery and better mobilized artillery. At the same time, however, it must be reemphasized that the Soviet Army has done nothing with nominal atomic loads. True they have paraded tactical missiles on May Day, but there has been no United States Army testimony—and this is the agency from which one would normally expect it—that these were primarily for atomic warheads, or that warheads have been developed which would fit them.

There has also been considerable reduction in Russian military manpower over the past 18 months or so. This may be accounted for in terms of the effects of the World War II slump in the birthrate. On the other hand the expansion of automation in the U.S.S.R. does not seem to warrant any crisis in industry which would demand any such reduction as has actually taken place in the Army. It may just be that Soviet planners are changing their collective minds as to the validity of the concept of a major high explosive war in a nuclear age.

In other words, in the last analysis the Russians will buy the weapons they want and not those they need—just as the United States has and will continue to do. A military force is a social phenomenon, and hence is swayed, as is society, by whims, by fashions, fads and the fiction of the moment. It is not necessarily built on reason. It is emotional in character, and hence the direction which ideas are taking may be more important, in many respects, than is advancing technology.

One of the many things which makes it difficult for those of our military who have had contact with the Russians to understand them is that there is a serious lag in Soviet strategic thinking. Their thinking is several years behind ours.

The Soviet military have recently been

thinking, for example, of a preemptive war, one which will devastate United States bases, before the United States can devastate theirs. Our military have been thinking, at least to themselves, in these terms for many years. Of course, it is their business to do so. Given the state of the science of defense the only way in which the military can protect our citizens is *not* to let the enemy strike first. And the only way in which this can be done is to destroy enemy weapons before they fire!

Stable Deterrence

However, with the coming of more invulnerable bases from which missiles can be launched, i.e. through hardening and mobility, it is possible to envisage a situation—the current label is *Stable Deterrence*—in which weapons systems can withstand an enemy first strike and still strike back in retaliation. The technical ramifications of the concept of *Stable Deterrence* are at least as complex as the political ramifications of the concept of the *Balance of Power*, of which it might be said to be the technological counterpart. It involves the constant creation of new techniques of warfare, of weapon accuracy, of hardening, of finding and of avoidance. As a concept, however, it does offer less chance of accidental war than airborne alerts or orbital space weapons systems. It is one which maintains that degree of respect which is the first necessity of deterrence. At the same time it avoids panic, and the terrifying possibilities thereof. In short, the concept of stable deterrence is one in which one might hope to interest the Soviets.

Discussion of stable deterrence between United States and Soviet intellectuals has invariably broken down even under the most informal circumstances. The reason is simply misunderstanding of the meaning of the term. Thinking on strategic problems in the U.S.S.R. is roughly three years behind American thinking. For example, in his January 12, 1960, speech, Premier Khrushchev expounded a doctrine quite like that expounded by the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, several years ago. It was “massive retaliation” all over again.

While Soviet strategic thought can be said to be behind our own and following roughly the same path, this does not mean that it will

continue to do so. In an age of technological revolution there is inevitably a serious intellectual lag between possibility and policy. There is also a wide variety of alternative policies which may for a time be thought to be politically and technically feasible. But what the U.S.S.R. will take for reality over a five-year time span is anyone's guess—just as it is for the direction of American thought. All that can be said is that Khrushchev does seem to have an appreciation of the meaning of nuclear war—which his Chinese colleagues unhappily lack. For this understanding on the Soviet leader's part, mankind can be temporarily thankful.

A Russian Advantage

The Russians may, however, have one great advantage in the future, their devotion to basic research. In World War I, manpower might be said to have been the basic factor in victory. In World War II, it was brute industrial production. In the period after World War II, technological research and development have been the key to national military power. In the future, however, pure research may be far more important than development.

The new problem in war is the major scientific breakthrough: the weapon systems which can x-ray the oceans, can disintegrate missiles in space, can paralyze the nervous system of a nation or can block out command systems. Such breakthroughs as these, triumphs comparable to the production of atomic energy, are the greatest future threat. There is a serious question as to whether the United States, which has always had a “practical” anti-scientific bias, can match the U.S.S.R. in the energy it puts into research.

There is also a question in the minds of many students of military affairs as to whether the use of military force, except in minimal local situations, is not a thing of the past. Nihilism was a doctrine which a Hitler or a Goebbels could espouse because nihilism was not feasible. Today it is. And nothing cools passion for an ideology so quickly as feasibility. This being the case, the future of warfare is more likely to be political and economic in the broadest sense than it is military.

Taking a historian's view of Russian foreign policy, this specialist notes "two reasons which make a war most improbable . . . the nature of the new armaments, . . . and the growth of world public opinion." He believes that "the cold war will go on without deteriorating into a hot war," but he warns that "peaceful coexistence is only a pleasanter name for cold war."

Khrushchev's Foreign Policy

By HANS KOHN

Professor of History, City College of New York

LATE IN 1959, the prospect of world peace seemed to the general public most promising. Nikita Khrushchev had visited the United States. He came with his family and showed himself as a man with a sense of humor and with a touch of the common folk. His reception, for these very reasons, had been on the whole friendly. There was no untoward incident. The summit conference was accepted as certain, and generally the public expected some good results from it. Khrushchev talked of peaceful coexistence, and of the avoidance of World War III, and did not advance any ultimatum regarding the position of West Berlin.

By the summer of 1960, the public mood had changed. The summit conference ended in failure. While still stressing the desire for, and the need of, peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev was full of angry words, and some of the familiar accusations against the government of the United States which belonged to the liturgic formulas of former Soviet utterances reappeared in full strength.

Nevertheless, there has been no real

change in the situation. No summit conference could have changed the fundamental fact that there are two opposing and mutually exclusive systems of understanding human nature and the course of history, each of which is convinced of its superiority, its final survival value, and its victory. The existence of these two opposite systems is the cause of the existing tension. There is no need to believe that this tension can be decisively lessened. There is equally no reason to believe that it will lead to war.

There are two reasons which make a war most improbable. The first one is the nature of the new armaments, the consequence of which will make war disastrous even for the victor. The second, and by no means lesser (though frequently overlooked) reason, is the growth of world public opinion as a factor indirectly influencing policy. This world opinion is not only that of the democratic and the Communist worlds. Since 1945, a third world has emerged and asserts itself more and more. This world is neither traditionally democratic nor Communist; it does not wish to depend either on Moscow or Washington, and this fact has changed the world situation and altered the bipolarity which characterized it in 1945 and in the years immediately following.

Whether Khrushchev uses sweet or violent language, the cold war will go on without deteriorating into a hot war. Whenever Khrushchev uses sweet language, the continuing tension will be called peaceful coexistence. Though sweet language sounds better than violent words, it must not lull the West into somnolence, which is one of the

Hans Kohn has been for many years a student of nationalism and international affairs. Among his many books are *Making of the Modern French Mind* (1955), *American Nationalism* (1957), *The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in Its Origins and Background* (1944), now in its seventh printing, and *The Mind of Germany* (1960). He is a contributing editor of *Current History*.

purposes of the use of the sweet language. Peaceful coexistence is only a pleasanter name for cold war. In their essence they are the same.

The tension between the U.S.S.R. and its East European friends on the one hand and the Chinese People's Republic on the other hand—a tension which was one of the most important events of 1960—clearly shows that Khrushchev is bent upon preserving the cold war as a cold war. For obvious reasons Communist China views the world situation differently from Communist Russia. China has more than three times the population of Russia. The Chinese population lives on a much lower level. The country is 30 years behind Soviet Russia. It is much more secluded, isolated and xenophobic than Khrushchev's Russia. It cares much less about world public opinion. It knows much less of the outside world and of the real strength of the United States.

In that way Communist China's attitude resembles today much more Hitler's attitude with its deep contempt for Western strength and cohesion than Khrushchev's. Khrushchev knows of the strength of the United States; he speaks frequently of overtaking the United States in various fields of production and in various aspects of the standard of living and of public welfare. In a strange but revealing way the United States is a model for the Soviet Union. China, on the other hand, is much more self-centered and apparently much more conscious of its own coming superiority.

Intra Communist Split

Thus at present the wing of world communism following Khrushchev's lead maintains that communism can reach its goal without war, on the strength of its own achievements and through the disintegration of the democratic world (a view similarly held by the democratic world about its survival and final victory), whereas the wing of world communism following China's lead believes in the inevitability of war as long as democracy—called capitalism or imperialism—exists. The Chinese spokesmen regard it as a dangerous illusion to believe that democracy will disintegrate without war.

They are convinced that World War III

will end with a sweeping triumph of communism all over the globe. The First World War, they say, led to the establishment of Leninism in the Russian Empire; the Second World War resulted not only in an immensely strengthened Communist Russia under Stalin but also in the expansion of its doctrine and influence over central eastern Europe to the Elbe River and the Adriatic Sea on the one hand, to China, North Korea and North Vietnam on the other hand, an expansion which in 1939 no one would have foreseen and which was bought at the cost of great suffering by the Russian people. World War III, at the expense of great suffering, will end in the final triumph of communism. Time does not work for the victory of communism; war does. Khrushchev does not share this point of view. Nor does Tito or Gomulka.

This very real difference in judging the world situation does not, however, destroy the unity and the cooperation of the Communist bloc. For the time being and for the foreseeable future the leadership in this bloc belongs to Soviet Russia. This will help to make the outbreak of World War III improbable. It is sometimes forgotten that a relatively short while ago the outbreak of a major war was threatened around the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The war, then expected by many, did not happen.

The situation in West Berlin is not very different. In spite of all the bitter denunciations of Chiang Kai-shek as an aggressive warmonger, the Chinese Communists know well that under today's circumstances Chiang Kai-shek cannot invade the Chinese mainland. In spite of all the vituperation against Adenauer as a second Hitler preparing a war against the East, it is quite clear not only that Adenauer is in every way different from Hitler but also that power relationships in Europe have completely changed in the past 20 years, and this as a result of Hitler's criminal folly.

Germany today is much smaller and weaker than she was in 1939, and Russia today is much larger and infinitely stronger. The Germany of 1939 was defeated by the Russia of that time. A similar venture today would be outright madness. The chances of Germany in 1939 were enhanced by two facts which do not exist any longer. On the

one hand, France and Britain did not enjoy the full and open support of the United States, and Germany did and could expect that the United States, voluntarily disarmed and in the throes of an economic depression, would stay out of the war. Today the United States is fortunately highly armed and in closest cooperation with Britain.

On the other hand, there were a number of weak and disunited states between Germany and Russia, which afforded to the Germans the possibility of imposing their will and domination over these states easily. At present these states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, are close allies of Russia and can count immediately on her full support. They are today also more industrialized and better armed than they were in 1939.

Whether or not the mind of Germany has changed in the last 15 years, there is no doubt that objective conditions and power relationships are no longer those of 1914 or 1939 and make impossible a third attempt on the part of Germany to establish her hegemony in central and east-central Europe:

Nato

Under the protective shield of Nato, Western Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, has made great progress toward a peak of unprecedented prosperity. So long as Nato is firmly maintained, there is no great danger of deterioration in the Berlin situation. It is to be hoped that the insistence on a fundamental revision of Nato in President de Gaulle's press conference of September 5, 1960, will have no effect and that Nato will not be weakened.

In Europe, outside France, it was generally felt that the two favorite ideas of President de Gaulle—a three power directory within the alliance, and purely national control over its military forces—would weaken the peace and security of Europe. The Athens newspaper, "Ethnos," summed up prevailing European opinion when it wrote on September 6:

General de Gaulle's speech may flatter French national susceptibilities but can hardly be said to serve Nato. . . . If all Nato forces came under a purely national command, how could we ever ensure unity of defense and immediate reaction of a common defense system in the

event of a Soviet surprise attack? . . . Unfortunately for the free world, the General seems far more interested in the grandeur of France than in present reality, the gravity of which is persistently outlined by Soviet actions.

At the time of writing—the beginning of September, 1960—it seems highly improbable that the Berlin situation will lead to serious aggravations in the near future. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany can be expected, with the support of its British and American allies, to forego all demonstrations of a prestige policy which would not change the reality. Berlin will not become again, in any foreseeable future, the Reichshauptstadt, which it was in the short time of the Second and Third Reich from Bismarck to Hitler. At the same time, Britain and the United States will not allow the liberty of the West Berlin people to be endangered. As Professor Karl Jaspers pointed out in August, 1960, the concern of the Germans cannot be primarily national unity or reunification but the maintenance and expansion of liberty.

Cold War Expansion

With the broadening of the world stage, which has gone on rapidly since 1945, the center of the cold war has been shifting from Europe to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In spite of the errors committed by the West in Egypt and the Arab lands, and in spite of the French war fought in Algeria and of recent Belgian mistakes in the Congo, the Asian and African leaders have in their vast majority clearly shown that their concern is with the independence, dignity and welfare of their peoples and that they show no inclination whatsoever to exchange Western domination for Soviet domination.

The moderation shown by the leaders of the independent African countries in the recent Congo crisis and in the United Nations has again proved this fact. Only if denied recognition of their rights—of those rights which they learned from the West—by the West, will African, Arab and Asian leaders turn for assistance to the Soviet Union.

It would be wrong for the West to respect the rights and dignity of Asians, Arabs and Africans out of fear of Soviet competition.

(Continued on page 284)

"It is reasonably certain . . . that the growing economic might of the U.S.S.R. is a major factor behind the international policies of the Kremlin."

Russian Industrial Growth and Coexistence

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Professor of Economics, Columbia University

THE YEAR 1960 witnessed a truly remarkable change in the Kremlin's American policy—from Khrushchev's visit to the United States and the exaltation of the Camp David "spirit" to the torpedoing of the summit conference, the relentless vilification of President Eisenhower and the United States, the appearance of the Muscovites in Cuba, and the intensification of their efforts to insinuate themselves into other countries of the western hemisphere.

While the ultimate objective of international communism—the destruction of the capitalist environment—is known and immutable, and its short-term aims—the disruption of the precarious unity of the West, especially the dismantling of Nato and the elimination of American bases—are clear for all to see (except, of course, the incurably or willfully blind), the purpose of, and the reasons for, each particular Soviet move are

seldom entirely obvious. It is reasonably certain nevertheless that the growing economic might of the U.S.S.R. is a major factor behind the international policies of the Kremlin.

Is Soviet economic advancement as startling as is claimed by Khrushchev and his propaganda machine and as many foreign observers appear to believe? What part does it play in determining the relations between Russia and the other countries?

Economic Growth, 1959

The Western world is being continuously reminded of the rapid increase in Soviet productive capacity. As noted in these columns a year ago,¹ a report approved by the twenty-first congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union held that "gross industrial output in 1958 was 36 times as great as in 1913; the production of means of production—the foundation of the national economy—increased 83 times, and the output of machine building and metal working 240 times." The emphasis throughout the entire period of planned economy, that is, since 1928, was on the production of producer goods—plant, machinery and machine tools. It is claimed that the actual performance of the economy exceeds the planned assignments.

These trends were continued in 1959 and 1960. According to a report of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers' central statistical administration issued in January, 1960, the plan for 1959—the first year of the new seven year plan—called for an increase of 7.7 per cent in industrial production, including an

Michael T. Florinsky is the author of many books including *Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.* (1951); a two-volume study of *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (1953); and *Integrated Europe?* (1955). Former editor of *Commercial and Tariff History*, 1939–1941, he is a member of the American Economic Association and the Economic History Association, among others. From 1921 to 1932, Mr. Florinsky served as associate editor of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

¹ M. T. Florinsky, "Soviet Industrialization and the Cold War," *Current History*, November, 1959.

8.1 per cent increase in the output of means of production and a 6.6 per cent increase in the output of consumer goods. Actually the volume of industrial production in 1959 rose more than 11 per cent; included in this figure was a 12 per cent increase in the output of means of production and a 10.3 per cent increase in the output of consumer goods. The aggregate value of industrial production is said to have exceeded the planned target by nearly 50,000 million rubles.

The gross industrial output—the meaning of this term is not made entirely clear—of each of the 15 union (or constituent) republics of the U.S.S.R. showed overfulfillment of the plan for 1959 and was substantially higher than in 1958. With the exception of certain types of agricultural machinery, freight cars, bicycles, motorbicycles and silk fabrics (the production of which declined in 1959), the output of every item comprised in the extensive list of the central statistical administration showed a marked increase over the preceding year. The 1959 output of the principal industrial materials is indeed impressive: pig iron, 43 million tons; steel, 59.9 million tons; iron ore, 94 million tons; oil, 129.5 million tons.

The production of consumer goods, although less favored than that of producer goods, registered some advance. In 1959 Soviet industry produced 4,600 million square meters of woolen fabrics, 389 million pairs of leather footwear, 1.6 million cameras, 4 million radios, 1.3 million television sets, 426,000 refrigerators, 724,000 washing machines. These figures may not seem impressive for a population of over 200 million, but they indicate a move in a direction that is likely to meet with the approval of the consumers, especially the upper level of the bureaucracy.

It is admitted that light industry has still a long way to go before the needs of the consumers are fully met.

While the production of many light industry items for which there is an increased public demand rose substantially, [says the report], the rise in the production of a number of items, particularly white goods and satin, was slight. The production of staple suiting and heavy dress fabrics is developing slowly. Some of the enterprises of light industry still continue to produce

fabrics and knitted items of dull colors and patterns and also footwear of unimaginative style.

Modernization of Plant and Equipment

Modernization of equipment and the introduction of the most advanced industrial techniques are increasingly important elements in the drive for industrialization and greater productivity of labor which is one of the pillars of the Soviet program. The report of the central statistical administration for 1959 states that “more than 2,000 major new types of machines, mechanisms, devices and other equipment were developed and produced.” Some 400 novel items of equipment and industrial materials were put into production on a mass production basis. Fifty thousand machine tools were modernized in 1959, or 20 per cent more than in 1958. At the same time, the report adds, “a number of economic councils and enterprises did not fulfill their assignments for developing the production of new types of equipment and materials: there are still many enterprises producing equipment and articles of obsolete design.”

It is claimed that technical progress is being achieved with the active participation of the working masses. In 1959, according to the report, 2 million inventors and rationalizers submitted 3.3 million proposals aimed at improving production; over 2 million improvements were actually adopted and introduced, resulting in an alleged saving of more than 10,000 million rubles. The method by which this staggering figure was arrived at is not disclosed.

The authorities, however, are not satisfied with the results obtained. Two plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Party in June, 1959, and in July, 1960, dealt with the application to production of the latest achievements in science and technology. The proceedings of these conferences which were attended by leaders of industry present a revealing picture of the achievements and failures in the attempts to raise labor efficiency.

Meanwhile, Soviet leaders decided that the methods of financing enterprises were inimical to technical progress. An announcement issued jointly by the Party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers early in July, 1960, noted that

"there are still major shortcomings in the practice of the economic stimulation of enterprises and the material encouragement to the personnel of industry" and other branches of the economy "in the creation and introduction of new machinery and new technological processes in the mechanization and automation of production." The existing system of managing the funds of the enterprises, said the announcement, is not conducive to the adoption of advanced technique.

All additional expenditures involved in mastering the production of new machines and equipment are added to the cost of such machines and equipment; . . . this frequently leads to a decline in the profits of enterprises that develop the production of new machinery, and the high price set on this machinery can impede its adoption by other enterprises.

The July announcement outlined two sets of measures which were embodied in a separate decree: (1) reallocation of the funds of enterprises in a manner that would provide for bonuses for the fulfillment of work on new machines; and (2) revision of the price determination procedure. It was provided that

temporarily wholesale prices for newly developed products of the machine-building and metal-working industries are to be fixed at the current level of wholesale prices of the earlier developed products of the same type . . . with corrections for the higher productivity and other technical and economic advantages for the user . . . of the new products.

Both these changes of policy are revealing. The bonus is a familiar device which has consistently been used and frequently revised and amended during the three decades of the planned economy—without ever achieving its objective. The latest dispensation introduces a highly diversified (and seemingly elusive) system of bonuses. Is there any real reason for believing that it will prove more successful than its numerous predecessors? The persistence in the use of this discredited method is a telling comment on the staleness and unimaginative approach of Communist economic theory and Soviet administrative practice.

The alleged stifling of technical progress by "monopoly capitalism" is a familiar doctrine of Socialist theology. It is surprising—and refreshing—to be told by Soviet leaders

that Socialist financial administrative methods have a similar effect. The lack of an adequate price theory has long been a flagrant weakness of Communist economics. The latest regulations for fixing the prices of new machines, equipment and industrial materials at an artificial level arbitrarily determined by the authorities and unrelated to the cost of production corroborate the above generalization and contribute to the chaos of the Soviet price system.

These melancholy observations should not be interpreted as a denial of the technical advancement in the Soviet Union. The increase of the volume of industrial output is an extremely important factor and the spectacular achievements of the Soviets in space studies—even if their practical significance for science and defense has probably been over-estimated—are conclusive evidence that, in some fields at least, Soviet technology is second to none. In view of the place held by Russia in science since perhaps the middle of the last century this should be no surprise. The Russians nevertheless have still a long way to go before their huge bureaucracy can fully control the complex mechanics of a huge modern state. Indeed, it remains to be proved that socialism or communism can effectively perform this task.

International Implications

The fact and fiction of Soviet economic growth explain to some extent the arrogance and aggressiveness of Moscow's international policy. The days when the unrewarding task of managing the underdeveloped countries was a preserve of the West are over. Soviet loans, industrial equipment, technical advisers and their political counterparts are available for the asking, indeed, are urged on the awakening nations in Africa, Asia and throughout the world. Time will show how much Soviet aid will contribute to the industrialization of the new states, but there is no doubt that it is a powerful factor in the disintegration of the colonial system and in undermining the position of the West in the lands where until recently Western domination was unchallenged. The resolve of the Soviet Union and her seven European satellites to consolidate and expand the sphere of their international economic activities is suggested by their adoption in December, 1959,

of the charter establishing the Mutual Aid Economic Council.

Several domestic measures enacted recently in the U.S.S.R. are likely to facilitate in various ways the implementation of her international ambitions. The reduction of the armed forces by 1.2 million men, announced in January, 1960, while presumably creating some rather thorny social and military problems, would bring welcome relief to the state budget and contribute to the easing of the perennial shortage of labor, thus fostering economic growth. A law of May 7, 1960, provided for the general introduction of the seven-hour day (six hours for underground work) in 1960; the complete transition by 1962 to the 40-hour week; and gradual changeover to a 30-35-hour week beginning in 1964. In this connection the venerable S. Strumilin, leading Soviet economist, visualized the general spreading of automation under communism and the eventual reduction of "obligatory work" to four hours per day, an enticing prospect.

Similarly appealing is the scaling down, beginning October 1, 1960, of the tax on wages and salaries, and its abolition on the lower incomes within six years. This reform, which is officially heralded as the "abolition of taxes on the population," leaves intact the existing system of taxation of the "socialist sector" including the turnover or sales tax which provides the bulk of Soviet revenue and is of course paid by the consumers, that is, "the population."

Of different order was the announcement made in May, 1960, of the revaluation of the ruble as of January 1, 1961. The new currency to be issued on that date will exchange for the currency now in circulation at the ratio of one new ruble for ten old ones. Rates of foreign currencies as well as financial obligations, prices, rents and so on will be adjusted accordingly. The international effects of revaluation which is presumably modeled on that of de Gaulle's "new franc" will be to better the standing of the ruble among the world currencies and thus add lustre to the Soviet economic system.

The mainspring of the effectiveness of Soviet economic intervention in foreign lands is to be found not so much in the growth of production and technical advancement, essential as they are, as in the unlimited con-

trol of the government over national resources and the subordination of economic policies to political aims. Oil is a case in point. In 1959, with 129 million tons, Russia ranked as the world's third largest producer. Her exports, however, were relatively small—24 million tons, of which, according to *The Economist* (July 16, 1960), only 17 or 18 million tons went beyond the iron curtain, that is, 2 to 3 per cent of the oil entering the international trade of the free world. Nevertheless Moscow's impetuous action made it possible for the Russians to supply, within a record time, a sizeable portion of the Cuban demand for oil. This move, *i.e.*, pouring oil—literally and figuratively—on the smoldering embers of Fidel Castro's communism, precipitated the conflagration that engulfed the Cuban properties of the American and British oil companies and tended to draw Cuba into the Communist bloc.

The Test of Coexistence

The dramatic change of Soviet policy towards the West that took place in the spring of this year is puzzling. Not every one on this side of the iron curtain accepts the Soviet version which puts full responsibility for the failure of the summit talks on the unfortunate U-2 incident. Other explanations suggest themselves. It is possible that on second thought Khrushchev realized that the visit to Moscow by President Eisenhower, a towering international figure, might lead to warm spontaneous demonstrations such as greeted Nixon in Poland, but on an even more impressive scale.

The post-summit policies of Moscow may well appear self-contradictory. The anti-American campaign could hardly have been more violent. Macmillan's somewhat naive but dignified and well-meaning appeal to Khrushchev brought forth a rebuke of utmost rudeness. The Russians rushed to the assistance of Fidel Castro, aligned themselves with Lumumba and other extremists in the Congo crisis, and brandished rockets over the Nato members who tolerate American bases on their soil.

Yet there seems to be a line which, if overstepped, may mean an open breach with the West, or even war, and beyond which at this time Khrushchev is unwilling to go. The

long threatened Soviet action on Berlin and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Eastern Germany remain dormant. Moscow has denied any intention of establishing rocket bases in Cuba and has not used its veto power in the United Nations to prevent the sending of an international armed force to the Congo although it did everything in its power to impede the success of the mission. Broad hints from the Kremlin suggest that summit conversations might be resumed after a change in the American administration, and after Khrushchev visited New York as head of the Soviet delegation to the U.N.

Finally—but this is a development of a different order—the trial of the pilot of the ill-fated American U-2 plane was, by Soviet standards, an exceedingly mild affair and the sentence relatively light. The proceedings, however, left in the dark the highly important question as to how the plane was actually brought down, and Powers' reticence and vagueness on this point, which was countenanced by the court, might have a bearing on the treatment accorded to the defendant.

What are the true reasons for the peculiar combination of aggressiveness and restraint in recent Soviet policies? An explanation which seems reasonable and has gained acceptance is that of an ideological conflict between the notion of "peaceful co-existence" with the West sponsored by Khrushchev and the uncompromising "death to the imperialists" attitude advocated by the left-wing Communists led by the Chinese. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5, 1960, Khrushchev declared that "the Soviet people have always looked upon themselves as the

advance guard of the international working class . . . in the struggle to build communism." But, he said, "Not by war shall we spread the ideas of communism. No!" The steadily improving standards of the Soviet people, abolition of taxation and the shorter working day would inevitably lead the workers of the world to realize that socialism and communism are "the right way to get rid of exploitation, unemployment, and poverty."

A notable article by Yu. Frantsev, editor of *Pravda*, which appeared in August, 1960, supported Khrushchev's position and argued that under modern conditions war would do great damage and "reduce the new society to ruins." Frantsev, a leading theorist of the party, added: "Why create things if the fruit of our labor will be destroyed by war?"

Thus formulated, the doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" shows kinship with Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country" which was expounded by the erstwhile mentor and chief of Khrushchev some 40 years ago. If, as it seems likely, the *Pravda* article reflects accurately the attitude of the Kremlin, it should be helpful in viewing the policies of Moscow in their true perspective.

A talmudic discussion of "peaceful co-existence" versus the inevitability of war took place at a large gathering of Communist leaders in Bucharest last June. It is believed that officially the doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" was approved but that the Chinese and some of the other Communist leaders remained unconvinced. If the above explanation is correct, Khrushchev's gyrations may be interpreted as a bold reassertion of Communist militancy while staving off the danger of war.

"An examination of the investigations upon which our planning is based indicates that the pattern of competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is presently shifting and that in the immediate future, as well as for the long run, the reliance will be less upon military weapon systems and more and more upon the use of economic, political, and psychological strategies to maintain and further the prosecution of the cold war. This is evident in the use by the Soviet Union (as well as by its Red Chinese allies) of economic aid programs for underdeveloped areas. It is also clear that the technological advances being made by both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have psychological and political overtones. . . . The implications here . . . will have considerable impact upon the appropriations for research, development . . . and many other means employed to hold our position as the leader of the free world coalition."

—G. L. Haller, Vice-President of the General Electric Company, in an address delivered on June 2, 1960.

In the cold war competition for influence among the underdeveloped nations, the Soviet Union has taken the economic offensive, urging "industrialization for all the less developed countries." "Part East, part West, the Soviet Union has cleverly impressed upon less developed countries that it is the natural leader of developing countries." This author provides a penetrating analysis of the reasons for the success of Soviet economic policy.

Soviet Trade and Economic Leadership

By ROBERT LORING ALLEN

Associate Professor of Economics, University of Oregon

SOVIET behavior in the world economy has begun to conform to a precise and relatively simple pattern. Having apparently decided that a military stalemate exists in the world, the Soviet Union in recent years has sought out and has begun to implement other policies designed to promote Russian and Communist interests in other countries. These supplementary policies include vigorous propaganda and psychological activity aimed at discrediting the industrial West economically and politically, diplomatic and political maneuvering which seeks to extend Soviet influence, ideological penetration, particularly in trade unions, student movements, and political leadership of countries, and in formidable economic forays through expanded trade and economic assistance.

Soviet, East European and Chinese foreign trade since 1953 have expanded rapidly and an economic assistance program of significant proportions has been inaugurated by these countries. It is submitted that these activities of the Soviet area are a manifesta-

tion of an energetic and relentless guerrilla type of economic warfare. Its purpose is to sow discord and distrust among free world nations, to set at odds the partners of the Western alliance, and to increase the prestige of the Soviet state and communism, particularly among less developed countries. Although still on a modest scale, these foreign economic activities are gradually increasing as situations arise which permit the Soviet Union to participate in the economic life of an increasing number of countries.

The Soviet area has had signal success, not so much because of the quantities of resources involved or the development of permanent and satisfactory commercial relations, but rather in convincing less developed countries by the novelty, astute conduct, and timing of its operations that the Soviet Union is sincere in purpose and anxious to promote their welfare. It must be admitted, however, that Soviet economic relations with any less developed country are not the result of the workings of the market place, but are part of a complex politico-economic decision designed primarily to improve the position of the Soviet Union in that country and in the world at large. Mutual economic advantage between the Soviet Union and its trading partner does not result from any premeditated action on the part of the Soviet Union. This may result as a by-product of achieving Soviet goals, but reverse consequences have been sufficiently numerous to indicate that

Robert Loring Allen is assistant director of the Institute of International Studies and Overseas Administration, University of Oregon. He is the author of *Soviet Economic Warfare* (Public Affairs Press, 1960).

economic benefits, either for the Soviet Union or for its trading partner, are not the fundamental consideration.

Soviet Techniques

Communist countries are using at least five related devices in their foreign economic activities. One consists of minute amounts of aid. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe contribute a token amount—about \$3 million per year in nonconvertible currencies—to the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and to the Special Fund of the United Nations. All the Communist countries have also made small unilateral grants to a few less developed countries.

Of more importance is the second device—the establishment of lines of credit for selected less developed countries. In this activity the Soviet Union is the leader but Eastern Europe also actively participates. The Soviet area has in the past four years agreed to loan nearly \$4 billion to more than a dozen less developed countries. India, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Argentina, Cuba, Ethiopia, Guinea and many other countries have received substantial Soviet loans. In addition, nearly every less developed country in the world has received loan offers from Communist countries.

The third device is trade. In many instances Eastern European nations, most notably Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, have been in the forefront here. After trade ties have been established with these countries, the Soviet Union enters the field and frequently has become a more important trading partner than any of the East European countries in a very short period of time, particularly when Soviet credit is involved.

Two lesser techniques have also been adopted. Communist-controlled institutions in free world countries, such as banks or commercial enterprises, have been used to favor Soviet commercial interests. Finally, the Soviet Union has directly interfered in the world market for selected products. The sale of oil, tin, aluminum and other products, sometimes at prices lower than those prevailing in the world markets, are the most obvious examples of this device. In general, these operations have been associated with

Soviet efforts to break into new export markets.

In general, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have insisted upon bilateral balancing in their new trade with less developed countries whenever possible. This device enhances the political implications of commerce and tends to favor the stronger trading partner. Bilateral balancing also prevents less developed countries from buying in the cheapest markets and selling in the dearest, and tends to create an economic dependence upon the Soviet area. In addition, loans to less developed countries have been made by means of blocked accounts—only equipment and technicians from the lending country are available under the terms of the credit agreements.

Soviet Motives

The trade and lending activities of the Soviet Union have not been built up gradually, but rather have been sporadic, reflecting the vicissitudes of international politics, the opening of favorable opportunities and problems in the domestic economies of both the Soviet Union and its trading partners. When Russian strength is adequate and an auspicious occasion arises, the Soviet Union moves rapidly to exploit the situation. In 1956 and 1957, for example, during the period of difficulty in the Soviet economy as well as unrest and revolution in Eastern Europe, no significant loans were made. Since that time, whenever an opportunity arose, the Soviet Union was prompt in making economic gestures. When Ghana became free, a Soviet trade delegation was dispatched almost at once. When Guinea received its independence trade immediately began to increase and loan negotiations were undertaken. The Cuban revolution was the signal for Soviet loan and trade offers.

The fact that Soviet bloc efforts have thus far been intermittent and on a relatively modest scale should not be construed as meaning that these countries could not mount and maintain a large sustained program, if need or desire arose. The Soviet Union is the world's second most powerful industrial nation and its credit commitments are quite small relative to its total production. Furthermore, there may be some strictly economic forces favoring Soviet activities

abroad. In some respects, Eastern Europe and China have probably been an increasing burden to the Soviet economy. In order to maintain its control over the bloc, the Soviet Union has had to provide raw materials and machinery which could have been used advantageously at home. The development of more extensive trade between Eastern Europe and China, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other, might be able to relieve the Soviet Union of some of its burdens.

Not to be ignored is the important effect upon the Soviet internal cost structure of 30 years of industrialization. The costs of capital goods production have declined relatively as labor and management have become more skilled, as plant and equipment have increased productivity, and as large-scale production has become possible. Extractive industries, on the other hand, have generally faced seriously increasing costs because of reduced amounts of low cost ores, coal and other minerals, as well as high yield land. It may now be increasingly to Soviet economic advantage to sell simple types of capital goods and buy raw materials and food. Petroleum, which is being used as an *entré* into many less developed countries, is an important exception to these cost trends. Eastern Europe has a strong economic motive to increase trade with primary producers in order to support its industrialization program with raw materials.

The techniques of bilateralism and state trading provide an incentive in their tendency to improve Soviet terms of trade. Failure of the Soviet bloc to participate in the world market for raw materials, for example, prevents a price rise which would certainly have occurred if the Soviet Union had not made its purchases bilaterally. The Soviet Union can even offer a price slightly higher than the world market price and still come out ahead, since this practice—bilateralism—enables the Soviet Union to raise its export prices. Thus, in a setting of bilateralism the terms of trade tend to favor the Soviet Union.

The fundamental motive for Soviet foreign trade is economic. The manner in which this trade is conducted, the techniques employed, the countries with which the Soviet Union trades, and the Soviet economic

behavior are, however, dictated by political considerations.

Magnitude of Soviet Efforts

The capacity or even the existence of economic advantages, however, does not necessarily imply anything about the magnitude of Soviet efforts. The size of these efforts is determined by Soviet goals, ideological considerations, internal problems and external world conditions.

Several factors suggest a continued modest activity in the world at large, but with rapidly expanding activities in some particular regions, such as Africa. The Soviet Union has very large capital requirements to maintain its own growth and equip its armed forces. Less developed countries also want capital goods and so are competing with internal bloc programs. It is worth noting that Soviet capital goods exports continue to be relatively small. In recent years only about 20 per cent of total Soviet exports have been in the form of manufactured goods and more than 90 per cent of Soviet capital goods went to countries inside the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Union also has large and continuing commitments to Eastern Europe and China. In the postwar period loans of at least \$7 billion have been made to these areas. There is some evidence that Eastern Europe and particularly China have become jealous of Soviet agreements to extend economic assistance to less developed countries. Certainly more loans will be required to maintain economic growth in Eastern Europe and viability in China, and to prevent attempted defections. Furthermore, the dogma of autarky, basic to Communist doctrine, continues to hamper normal commercial relations.

Ultimately, the size of Soviet efforts will be determined by what it takes to accomplish its goals. So far, a relatively small activity has gone a long way toward achieving these aims. Since the Soviet Union is not basically interested in stability and economic development in less developed countries, a massive program may not be necessary or even desirable from its point of view. Certainly the nature of Soviet economic activities—opportunistic, disruptive and expedient—would not be likely to require a large commitment of resources.

Certainly it cannot be argued that less developed countries are not benefiting at all from Soviet trade and economic assistance. It is clear, however, that so far they have obtained relatively little and will probably continue to get relatively little. These countries are definitely not getting the favorable terms that they had been led to expect. Soviet malperformance and omissions have in many instances nullified whatever favorable terms were initially offered. Much of the Soviet assistance is not calculated to improve the economic lot of the recipients. Rather, it is frequently channeled into arms, sports palaces and model farms. In addition, while acquiring a quite marginal economic gain, less developed countries are being subjected to substantial political and psychological pressure to pursue policies that will alienate them from Western trade and economic ties and that will lend support to Soviet international policies. In this way, in some instances a considerable economic dependence upon the Soviet area has developed as Western markets have shriveled. This happened in Iceland in the period 1952-1958, in Egypt in 1955-1959, and is happening in Cuba and Guinea in 1960.

Soviet Performance

The success of Soviet efforts in particular countries and situations has not been complete. The Soviet Union is woefully inexperienced in commercial relations. Its trade has always been small and the Soviet Union does not seem to be aware of or able to adhere to accepted commercial practices. Even more important, however, is conflict within the Soviet Union. High level policy people make extravagant claims and promises to less developed countries. But the implementation of these promises is in the hands of a lower level group interested primarily in seeing that the Soviet Union suffers no economic loss. Conflict between these two groups is manifested in erratic and inconsistent behavior in less developed countries.

Less developed countries have been disappointed at the slow rate of delivery of Soviet goods. Eastern Europe has been somewhat more prompt but the entire Soviet area has in many instances become a debtor by its failure to export. Burma was bitterly disappointed by the Soviet failure to deliver goods already

paid for in rice. Indonesia has had trouble with export surpluses in trading with Eastern Europe. Latin America has lost considerably on its credit balances. Egypt became so disturbed over its credit balances that it insisted upon canal toll payments in transferable currencies. Other criticisms concern high priced exports, poor quality and a limited selection of goods, re-exportation of products from primary producers, delay or failure to deliver on export commitments, and the upsetting of commodity markets, as in the case of tin.

Soviet Impact

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the relatively modest Soviet efforts should not be interpreted as a failure of these foreign economic activities in exerting influence. Some less developed countries have been influenced and a few, such as Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan, are heavily mortgaged to the Soviet area. Soviet performance has been improving with experience. Serious attempts are being made to correct mistakes and avoid their repetition. Indeed, failures are sometimes turned to advantage. Burma, annoyed over slow Soviet exports, was offered a tripartite agreement which enabled it to buy Czechoslovakian goods with rubles, thereby convincing the Burmese of Russia's sincerity of purpose and willingness to do its best.

Overriding the particular successes and failures of Soviet actions, however, is the fact that due in no small part to recent foreign economic operations the Soviet Union has radically altered the world picture of itself in an incredibly short period of time. Before the initiation of these activities the stereotype of the Soviet Union was that of a malevolent monolith interested in extending its own power, by force if necessary. Now many countries see a new Soviet image, benevolent, interested in helping other countries develop economically, and anxious to reduce world tensions.

This new image is probably the most important factor in Soviet foreign economic activities, yet it serves only as the initial allure. If the Soviet Union can maintain this new posture, learn from its mistakes, and avoid embarrassing misadventures, it can possibly achieve greater successes, and extend its influence. Ultimately it may succeed in iso-

lating some less developed countries from Western Europe and North America.

One of the most significant reasons for Soviet successes has been the novelty of recent Soviet actions. Soviet economic and technological advances, as well as its present general international posture, partly explain the attraction. Recently in an underdeveloped state itself, the Soviet Union has made much of its position as benefactor to countries now embarking upon their own development.

The impact can also be partly explained in terms of the growth of the Soviet economy through centralized planning techniques. Less developed countries, many of which have adopted economic planning, have been told repeatedly that the Soviet Union has telescoped the path to economic maturity and now desires to help them. Impressed as they are by the apparent prowess of Soviet industry, these countries accept with enthusiasm Soviet promises of capital goods on credit and to buy raw materials.

The content of Soviet economic assistance has also carried weight with less developed countries. They want industrial development; they see the gigantic accomplishments of modern industry; they are impressed by large-scale production techniques and value the trappings of industry and technology. These are more than a means to raise the standard of living; they are symbols of national power. Every country must have a steel mill, a refinery, a nuclear reactor. The Soviet Union offers them these, as well as the technical assistance to put them into operation. Soviet leaders extoll the virtues of centralized planning and Soviet assistance is stressed as the means of progress toward maturity. Soviet leadership has consistently endorsed industrialization for all the less developed countries.

It may also be argued that increasing Soviet influence in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America is a natural phenomenon, given the geographic position of Russia and the great power of the Soviet state. The West has long been dominant in these areas and has acquired an unsavory reputation. As the West's influence has receded, the Soviet star has risen. Part East, part West, the Soviet Union has cleverly impressed upon less developed countries that it

is the natural leader of developing countries. Furthermore, less developed countries, disaffected with the West because of real and imagined injustices, frequently tend to regard the Soviet Union as a foil for the West.

One of the most important reasons for the favorable impact of Soviet activities has been the effective use of propaganda. Propaganda has long been a position of strength for Soviet leaders, and every device has been used to impress countries with the size, importance and mutually advantageous nature of Soviet efforts. Much emphasis is placed on the apparently favorable terms and supposed absence of strings. Less developed countries are also impressed by the attention of high Soviet officials and the respectful attitude of negotiators and diplomats. Such propaganda can only be characterized as shrewd and influential.

Much of the effectiveness of Soviet activities must ultimately be explained in terms of their flexibility and opportunism. The Soviet Union does not have a broad program and therein lies much of its strength. Rather, it is selective and specifically designed to exploit any favorable opening. The Soviet Union seeks to take advantage of any real or apparent difficulty in the free world. The disaffection of Guinea in the French Community, the urgency for economic development felt by Ghana and Ethiopia, the Cuban revolution and its anti-American aftermath, the difficulties in the Congo, falling export prices of primary products, and similar situations are those which the Soviet Union attempts to exploit to its advantage. Although the problem need not be of Soviet making, the Soviet Union is constantly ready with a loan, a trade agreement, a purchase contract, technical or military assistance.

Soviet economic warfare is potentially as hazardous as military warfare. The policies which the West can employ to counter the danger are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, however, that since Soviet actions are molded to fit free world vulnerabilities in commerce, economic development, and in political amity, it behooves the West to undertake imaginative and vigorous policies to eliminate the weaknesses on which the Soviet Union feeds. By eliminating its own vulnerabilities, the free world can minimize Soviet disruptive and exploitative activities.

Because Soviet planners seem to overlook "the human being," they fail to realize that "The appearance of mass unemployment would be a serious blow to the whole system of Communist dictatorship." This specialist raises the question: is there . . .

Unemployment in the Soviet Union?

By SOLOMON M. SCHWARZ

Author of *Labor in the Soviet Union*

FOR many years the Soviet Union claimed to have solved the problem of unemployment and to have achieved full employment. Essentially this was true for the urban segment of the economy, although not for its rural part. Universal planning and the possibility of making up losses in some parts of the economy through profits in others provided the opportunity for the development of the Soviet economy to allow it to absorb practically all the available labor force. Indeed, the lack of necessary checks and balances in the Soviet model of planned economy led to many deficiencies and unwarranted losses, but the fact of full employment was there.

In more recent times the situation began to change. It may sound paradoxical, but in a rapidly expanding economy, just when a

great birth deficit caused by war placed a strain on the labor market (the term "labor market" is taboo in the Soviet Union but the phenomenon remains), it is becoming increasingly clear that unemployment is once more a factor that cannot be disregarded.

Newspapers and economic journals avoid mentioning unemployment, but the question was first raised, in a way typical of the Soviet Union, in a novel by Fedor Panferov, *In the Name of Youth*, in the July issue of the literary magazine *October (Oktiabr)*. A writer of limited, and apparently declining, talent, Panferov has shown in the past an acute perception of the changes in the fluctuating line of the Communist leadership.¹ In his novel he employs his principal hero, Morev, the First Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Communist party in Privolzhsk Province, to touch upon the problem of unemployment in several situations throughout this work. According to the novel, several years ago oil was discovered in Privolzhsk Province. Well drilling activity proceeded at a feverish pace, but insufficient provisions were made for the storage or transportation of extracted oil. In result the ex-

Solomon M. Schwarz studied law and economics in his native Russia. He received a degree there, in Yaroslavl, and later in Heidelberg, Germany. His published writings in many languages deal for the most part with labor. Since 1940, Dr. Schwarz has lived in the United States, where he has taught at the New School for Social Research and at New York University. He is managing editor of the Russian monthly, "The Socialist Courier," and author of a study of *The Jews in the U.S.S.R.*

¹ It was in *October* (October, 1957) that Panferov as its editor-in-chief broached the question of the practical liquidation of machine and tractor stations (MTS), i.e., three months before Khrushchev openly advanced the same measure. It was also Panferov who in his preceding novel, *Meditation* (to which *In the Name of Youth* is a sequel), published just after the reform of industrial decentralization and of the creation of *sovnarkhozy* (councils of national economy), presented, under the fictitious name of G. G. Korkin, the new chairman of the Gosplan, I. I. Kuz'min, and allowed him to praise the advantages of the new economic reforms advanced by Khrushchev (*Znamia*, October, 1958).

plotation of wells suddenly had to be drastically curtailed, and an alarming number of oil workers lost their jobs. "Imagine," says Morev to his wife, "that you came from a village or a city high school to the oil fields and learned a trade, of which you could be justly proud, and then all at once you are classified as 'unemployed.' How would you feel?"

The above situation, however, was relatively mild in comparison with others that followed. A large automobile plant was partially converted to automation, leading to the reduction of 900 workers; at once fulfillment of the program lagged behind. The workers tacitly decided, "By automation you deprive us of work. Well, then, take that: we will not fulfill the program. If your automation continues to be introduced in the same way, we will say to you a mighty word."

In the novel, the following week the Provincial Committee meets to make the final decision on full automation of the plant. The principal speaker is a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, Elanskii, newly arrived from Moscow, who unfolds a compelling perspective before his listeners:

If the machinery at the plant were such that it required no repairs, maintenance or replacement, we could reduce the 13,000 workers at the plant to just 32 people with higher education who could control production from their desks without any workers. Under the existing technical conditions we have to retain 283 workers, the majority of whom are maintenance and repair specialists. . . .

With the introduction of full automation in the entire automobile and tractor industry of the country, about one million workers will be freed. Such is the brilliancy that automation is bringing to the Soviet Union.

Only two conferees at this meeting had some misgivings about the promises of this "brilliancy": Morev, who remained silent, and the secretary for industrial affairs of the Provincial Committee, Nikolai Korablev, until recently himself a director of the automobile plant. With some alarm the latter inquired of the speaker, "And what do you propose to do with the freed workers?" Brushing off the question, Elanskii replied, "This is your concern—yours, the politicians. If we have to think about human beings,

automation will never be accomplished." Elanskii was shouting, as he completed his remark, in a somewhat threatening tone. The audience enthusiastically gave its approval to these words.

The problems of automation and, more generally, of technical reconstruction are presently coming into the focus of concern of Soviet industrial leaders, and were the subject of discussion at the recent enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee, convened July 13–16, 1960. Eight reports were read at the Plenum, including one from the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Automation and Machine Building. All reporters apparently concurred with Panferov's Elanskii that "to think about human beings" is outside the scope of their business. Their example was followed by all the participants in the discussions, with the sole exception of the Chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Union Council (VTsSPS), V. V. Grishin, who cautiously approached the problem of unemployment resulting from technological innovations as follows:

It is known that as a result of the introduction of new technology, mechanization, and automation into production, labor requirements are diminished. Already today many enterprises have labor surpluses. In our view this problem requires an organized solution. It is imperative that the *sovnarkhozy*, the planning organs in the union republics, and the Gosplan of the U.S.S.R. elaborate measures for the better utilization of labor resources. The consideration of questions of labor utilization and organized placement of freed workers should be included in the compilation of annual production plans.

This appeal seemed to have fallen on deaf ears, and in the protracted resolution of the Plenum, "On the Development of Industry and Transportation and the Utilization of Advanced Achievements of Technology and Science" which took up more than two pages of *Pravda* (July 17), not a single line was devoted to the problem of "organized placement of freed workers." And when at the end of July the Plenum of the VTsSPS met to discuss the tasks of the trade unions in conjunction with the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee, no one, not even Grishin, brought up the question again (*Trud*, July 29–30) nor did it appear in the

long resolution of the Plenum (*Trud*, August 3).

Technical Reconstruction

In the field of labor policy, technical reconstruction primarily raises two sets of questions: that of vocational training and retraining, and that of "organized placement of labor." The former is widely and openly discussed in the Soviet Union, and much work undertaken in this direction has met with a degree of remarkable success.² On the other hand, the problem of "organized placement" has been treated with a certain degree of bashfulness and side stepping, and until recent times discussion on this subject was simply under a tacit prohibition.

In the early stages of the Soviet system, employment agencies (called "labor exchanges" at first) played an important role in Soviet labor policy. In 1933 they were abolished, together with the People's Commissariat of Labor. In contrast to labor security and social insurance, the administration of which was transferred to trade unions, employment agencies simply ceased to exist; employers became completely free to hire labor as they pleased, and the employees had to look for work in the conventional manner of knocking at the doors of enterprises. Only the so-called "organized recruitment of labor in kolkhozy" retained some semblance of order in this system of chaos.

In the quarter of a century that followed the debacle of 1933, time and time again timid attempts were made to revive employment agencies in some rudimentary form. The fear that the creation of such organs could be interpreted as a kind of capitulation before the concept of "labor market" foredoomed all these attempts.

The ostrich policy, evident even in the recent plenums of the Communist Central Committee and the VTsSPS, can hardly be sustained much longer. The idea of employment offices began to infiltrate Soviet specialized literature, and recently the question was

posed in a book by a Soviet expert on labor resources, M. Ia. Sonin,³ who recommended the establishment of a system of employment offices in every relatively large town. In reviewing this book, the *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* (May, 1960) reproached the author for his "timidity" in suggesting a local system of employment agencies, and stressed the idea that such a system must be organized on a larger scale not limited to local conditions. Perhaps these are signs that some concrete measures are about to be undertaken in this area.

This is the more probable, since the absence of employment agencies visibly handicaps not only employees but employers as well, a factor that is of considerable weight in the Soviet Union. In an interesting article in a leading literary magazine, *Novyi Mir* (July, 1960), a known Soviet newspaperman and journalist on socio-economic questions, A. Khavin, reports his observations of a plant conference:

The chief of a mechanical shop, an old experienced worker, was speaking about the work of his collective when he was abruptly interrupted by a remark from the chief engineer, "But all the same you failed to fulfill your quota towards labor productivity increase."

The shop chief answered immediately, "Yes, we did. But why? Simply because 15 workers, no longer needed in my shop, were not removed. What does this mean? Although we even overfulfilled the plan for automation, productivity per worker has not increased and the cost of production has not decreased. Is this unnatural? Not at all: look, we have as many turners as we had before, though only half of them are needed now."

Then the author continues:

Today such phenomenon can be observed here and there due to the sharp acceleration of technical development. It occurs, more often than not, because the problem was not thought through in due time as to how the automation of this or that industrial sector will affect the labor balance of the plant, and how labor could be redistributed most efficiently and painlessly.

Indeed, organized placement is only a part of labor redistribution. The latter demands considerably more before "painless" transfers of workers from plant to plant, from one locality to another or between trades can be-

² See my article, "Education for Russian Industry," in *Current History*, July, 1958. For the purpose of this article, further treatment of this matter is of little consequence and can be dispensed with.

³ In a book entitled *Reproduction of Labor Force in the USSR and the Balance of Labor*, Moscow, Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences, 1959—*Vosproizvodstvo rabochei sily v SSSR i balans truda*, Institut Ekonomiki, Akademiia Nauk, 1959.

come a reality. Here the trade unions have a vast amount of work cut out for them. However, judging from the reports of the last Plenum of the VTsSPS it seems that they are not even remotely prepared for this task.

Farm Labor Surplus

In principle, the problem of rising unemployment as a result of technical reconstruction in the agricultural segment of the economy is not dissimilar to that in the industry. However, even now in agriculture this question is masqueraded under the garb of unsatisfactory organization of labor, and in spite of extensive investments and mechanization, Soviet agriculture still takes up at least 40 per cent of the labor force, yet fails sufficiently to provide the country with the necessary agricultural products for the population and raw materials for industry. Prior to the last war the countryside sent annually great labor "surpluses" to the cities which were taken up by the expanding urban industries. The decline in the rural male population through the war weakened this process, but until recently the exodus of rural surpluses was a generally accepted phenomenon.

After the reconstruction of Soviet agriculture, which began in the fall of 1953 and which led to great increases in agricultural production, the rural exodus conspicuously declined and this led many to doubt the existence of rural surplus population. There are some indications not only that there is no longer any surplus population in the villages, but also that Soviet agriculture might even be suffering from a shortage of labor. Thus there is a sharp decline in the "organized recruitment of labor in kolkhozy" and in the practice of directing urban youth to agricultural colonization in the eastern areas. Mobilizing workers and employees in the cities for temporary farm work during the harvests is widely practiced. All these, however, are temporary phenomena, and it is not by chance that the latest Soviet agricultural policy is aspiring to return the countryside, in new forms of course, to a situation where once again growing industry could rely on villages to provide for increases in the

labor force. The growing pressure on the private economies of kolkhozniki and the attempts to introduce money remuneration for work in kolkhozy are among the more important manifestations of this policy.

It would be impossible to continue here any detailed analysis of these developments, but a few figures might indicate the orientation of the thinking of Soviet official circles towards agricultural progress. The vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Senin, reported in the last Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. that the "complex" (i.e., full) mechanization of livestock breeding in the kolkhozy of the Ukraine will reduce the cost of producing one quintal of meat from 38 "work days" in 1958 to approximately 3 or 4 work days; correspondingly, in the production of pork, labor expenditures will be reduced to one-twentieth, and in milk production to one-seventh. According to the reporter, the complex mechanization of livestock breeding in the kolkhozy of the republic will decrease labor requirements by 900,000 workers (*Pravda*, July 14, 1960).

An even more extreme view is taken by S. G. Strumilin, member of the Academy of Sciences and an authority on Soviet economics, who states that the technical reconstruction of agriculture will "free" up to 12 million workers by 1965, 20 million by 1970 and 30 million by 1975.⁴ Even if these calculations border on fantasy, a sharp rise of labor productivity in Soviet agriculture is not only necessary and possible, but in some respects is inevitable; this means that in the coming decade a great number of agricultural workers will face the possibility of unemployment.

The Threat of Unemployment

Leading Soviet circles seem hardly to begin to realize how seriously these developments endanger the moral authority of the regime. The absence of unemployment was for over a quarter of a century one of the principal arguments of Communist propaganda, especially useful abroad. The appearance of mass unemployment would be a serious blow to the whole system of Communist dictatorship.

Planned economy, even in its grotesque

⁴ I have not yet been able to consult the article of Strumilin myself and have to refer to its coverage by Harry Schwartz in *The New York Times*, August, 15, 1960.

Soviet form, opens great opportunities for the alleviation of unemployment. Under certain conditions the appearance on the labor market of masses of "freed" labor, with wide experience in industrial work, might well become a source for a renewed upsurge and further growth of Soviet economy. Technically and economically speaking, this is entirely feasible, but it is rather questionable whether in the Soviet Union today such a course is workable socially. When the social degeneration of the Communist bureaucracy has advanced so far that even the thought of providing social guarantees to accompany automation appears naive, it is not too probable that the Communist leadership will be able to disentangle the complicated web of socio-economic questions. It is much more probable that the forthcoming developments will be accompanied by social tensions.

An instructive illustration of the above is the case described by Panferov where the workers of an automobile plant, after the dismissal of 900 of their co-workers as a re-

sult of partial automation, silently practice a form of veiled strike: "By automation you deprive us of work. Well then, take that: we will not fulfill the program," and if this continues "we will say to you a mighty word." In the phrases "Well then, take that . . ." and "We will say to you," there is perceptible contraposition between *we* and *you* which in this particular form is new in the Soviet Union, and is a sign that the relations between the working masses and the Communist leadership are beginning to develop towards a breaking point.

This case could not have been invented; Panferov would not have dared to go so far, all the more since he himself has no sympathies for workers who grumble about the regime. Undoubtedly he took the incident from real life. But this is the adverse side of the characteristic phenomenon when many at the top reject with a certain air of superiority the idea that in elaboration of ambitious plans for technical reconstruction, it is necessary "to think about human beings."

(Continued from page 269)

There is some suspicion abroad that it is the fear of the potentially growing influence of communism which inspires the liberal attitudes on the part of the West. In reality, the West, and above all the United States and Britain, must show an understanding of the aspirations of the Asian, Arab and Afri-

can peoples, not because the West fears communism, but because Westerners are aware of historical changes which have come about largely as a result of the penetration and the victory of modern Western ideas of human dignity and equality. In such a case, Communist hopes of turning the cold war of peaceful coexistence to communism's own advantage will be defeated.

"In our season of history, beyond any previous era, the world spectacle seems most violent in its surface turmoil; most intense in its inner passion; most titanic in its destructive potential. . . .

"Against the dangers inherent in the attitude and announced purposes of a powerful, secretive dictatorship, we steadfastly maintain the military, moral, economic and political strength to assure the nation's safety.

"Further, knowing that peace and freedom are weakened if not shared, we help other nations which, like ourselves, uphold the dignity of men and maintain their liberty. . . ."—*U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 26, 1960.*

Noting that "any objective appraisal must acknowledge the promising advances being made in agriculture," this specialist feels that "Khrushchev's tenure at the top rests, in part, on the success of . . . the many . . . agricultural reforms with which he has been intimately associated."

Khrushchev's Agricultural Changes

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

THE RISE to power of Nikita S. Khrushchev has occasioned a number of fundamental changes in the operation and organization of Soviet agriculture. Long regarded as the "Achilles Heel" of Soviet communism, the agricultural sector has in recent years been accorded a priority position by Soviet leaders in their attempt to raise the standard of living. Khrushchev gave expression to this new emphasis in his report to the Twenty-first Congress of the C.P.S.U., on January 27, 1959:

Comrades, a new and powerful upsurge in socialist agriculture will be of enormous importance for communist construction and increasing the peoples' prosperity. As was defined by the decision of the December plenary session of the Central Committee, the main agricultural task during the seven-year plan will be reaching a production level which will wholly meet the population's demands in the way of foodstuffs and industry's demands for raw materials output. Between 1959 and 1965 the gross volume of agricultural production is to increase 1.7 times. The average annual production increase will be eight per cent.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein is editor of *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (Random House, 1960). He visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958, and again in 1960. A lecturer in government at City College of New York in the summer of 1956, he was a Ford Foundation International Relations Fellow, 1956-1957, at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Mr. Rubinstein is CURRENT HISTORY's book review editor.

To attain these objectives, Khrushchev introduced innovations with far-reaching social, political and economic implications for Soviet society. Success of these measures will affect the pattern of political conflict and competition continually going on in the upper echelons of the Party. The program is closely related to the progressive relaxation of arbitrary state controls which has characterized post-Stalinist internal developments. An appreciation of the significance of these agricultural reforms can be obtained by reviewing briefly Stalin's policy toward agriculture and the peasant.

The Stalinist Pattern for Agriculture, 1928-1953

Once entrenched in power, Stalin embarked on a program designed to make the Soviet Union a great industrial power. The Five Year plans, introduced in October, 1928, required enormous investment capital. Denied (for ideological and political reasons) the possibility of borrowing abroad, and unable, as a result of the world-wide depression, to depend on foreign trade for sufficient foreign currency to import substantial quantities of heavy machinery, the Soviet leaders chose to extract the capital needed for industrialization from the peasantry. To do this required a "second revolution."

Previously, during the 1920's, the New Economic Policy (NEP), introduced by Lenin, had stimulated a restoration of internal trade and production. In agriculture, NEP had relied upon the peasant's desire for personal gain. Thus, he could own land, sell the produce remaining after high taxes-in-kind had been paid to the government,

and expand his private holdings. Agriculture revived and many peasants prospered. Paradoxically, this rejuvenated peasantry was invariably hostile to communism and to the Communist party. The paradox of Communist reliance upon a socio-economic group which was hostile to the fundamental objectives of communism was not lost on Soviet leaders. The peasantry represented a potential and potent threat to the regime.

Stalin's decision to collectivize agriculture rested on several conceptual pillars. Ideologically, the Communists favored a socialistic agriculture, one consonant with a socialist system; politically, collectivization provided a convenient way of liquidating a significant, antagonistic group; economically, collectivization promised more efficient utilization of labor and land. This was a particularly important consideration because, though agricultural production in 1927 approximated pre-war levels, the *marketed* share (the amount actually available to the government for sale abroad or for distribution in the cities) remained low in relation to total output; small-scale farming tended to produce for a local, not national, market. Finally, collectivization was designed to reduce rural underemployment and to swell the labor force available for work in factories and cities.

Thus in late 1929, the Party ruthlessly commenced collectivization and the "liquidation of the kulaks [the more prosperous peasants] as a class." By 1932, more than 50 per cent of all peasant households were forced into collectives; by 1936, the figure exceeded 90 per cent. The cost was staggering. During World War II, Stalin admitted to Churchill that more than ten million peasants had died of starvation as a result of collectivization. Production declined catastrophically and a livestock crisis broke out from which the Soviets have not yet recovered. But a new system of organization did emerge "that made possible thorough regimentation of agriculture, subjection of it to over-all economic planning, and above all, Government control over the distribution of farm output."¹ Stalin was then able to industrialize by robbing the peasants of their produce, in effect, and sell-

ing that produce to the urban population at enormous profit.

At the present time, most peasants live in *kolkhozy*—collective farms in which all holdings are owned by the collective. Each peasant household is permitted a small private plot on which crops and livestock can be raised for personal use. Members of *kolkhozy* receive a portion of the collective's earnings in cash and in produce. Until recently, the amounts received were negligible since the state took most of the crop as taxes-in-kind, or at forced sales at low prices. This resulted in an impoverished peasantry.

There are also the *sovkhozy*, or state farms, owned and operated by the state as commercial enterprises. Here workers receive a straight salary. All profits go to the state. The *sovkhozy* played a minor role in the Soviet economy during the Stalinist period, except in the sugar-beet industry. However, since 1955, Khrushchev has sought to expand their significance by making them into model farms, and thereby forcing the *kolkhozy* to become more competitive, i.e., more efficient.

Finally, the Machine Tractor Stations, about which more will be said in a subsequent section, were established to control the peasantry.

The socialization of agriculture accomplished Stalin's objectives. It established centralized control and made greater planning possible. But from the standpoint of productivity, collectivization has had a checkered history. It has left Soviet agriculture in a condition of chronic crisis. Inefficiency and waste are endemic. Production has increased, but at a slow, unimpressive rate. Though highly industrialized, the Soviet Union has a labor force which is still more than 40 per cent agricultural in character, compared with less than 8 per cent in the United States. In 1950, Stalin tried to weaken the *kolkhoz* system (and the state's dependence upon the collectives) by further amalgamations: in 1949, there were 254,000 *kolkhozy*; by 1953, the total number of collectives had been reduced to 94,000; today there are less than 80,000. But production levels, and especially per capita yields, remain distressingly low—a reflection of outmoded agricultural techniques and of the

¹ Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1951), p. 20.

continued hostility of the peasantry. Stalin's successors faced a problem of the first magnitude: how to raise agricultural production.

Post-Stalinist Trends

Six months after the death of Stalin, the Communist party leadership moved to raise the productivity and production of the agricultural sector of the economy. Realizing that the Stalinist formula had proved inadequate to the needs of a growing population, and that food production had to be substantially increased to ensure popular support for the regime, Soviet leaders undertook an overall appraisal of the shortcomings of Soviet agriculture. On September 3, 1953, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the newly appointed First Secretary of the Communist party, delivered a highly critical, comprehensive report to the Central Committee on the impoverished state of Soviet agriculture.

He noted, for example, that livestock production for 1953 remained, in general, at the levels achieved in 1916! The country had not made any progress in this respect since the Revolution. This could be attributed to the effects of the forced collectivization of the 1930's and to the extensive losses suffered during the Nazi invasion. But the principal weaknesses centered on the inadequate incentives offered to the peasant and on the prevalence of outmoded forms of production. Khrushchev criticized the failure to appreciate the importance of the personal plot of each individual collective farmer and of the contribution to national production quotas which it made. He called for an end to the antagonistic attitude taken by many bureaucrats toward the peasant plots. In addition, the imposition of unreasonable procurement quotas, the low level of fertilizer production, and the inefficiency of the ministry of agriculture came in for scathing criticism.

Though Khrushchev was unsparing in his attack on existing weaknesses in Soviet agriculture, he was careful to state that there was no question of abolishing the system of collective and state farms. Structural improvements and production efficiency were to be accomplished within the framework established by Stalin. One ironic political note might be mentioned: Khrushchev was Sta-

lin's principal assistant in charge of agriculture during the 1950-1953 period. He had been therefore directly responsible for the rapid amalgamation of small and medium size collective farms into larger units, and for the ill-fated effort to set up "agricultural cities." These moves were directly responsible for the continued reluctance of the peasant to increase productivity.

In an effort to encourage greater production, even prior to Khrushchev's speech, the government announced its willingness to permit farmers on collective farms to retain for their own use 10 per cent of the hay that they gathered; and a schedule of higher prices for livestock products and for harvested flax was established. A new farm tax law also affirmed the state's policy of allowing the peasants to keep their private plots, and provided tax relief for peasants investing their savings in cattle. These modifications were only a prelude of what was to come.

The Khrushchev Reforms

The "new deal" for the Soviet farmer has been most closely associated with the proposals and innovations introduced by Nikita Khrushchev. Though it is too soon to evaluate fully the success of the recent changes in Soviet agriculture, a review of the major reforms and their impact on Soviet society may be hazarded at this time. Generally speaking, Khrushchev has been instrumental in pushing the following programs and policies: a) the expansion of the number of state farms (sovkhozy) and the total crop areas sown by them, particularly in the uncultivated lands of Central Asia; b) the introduction of institutional changes in the organization and operation of Soviet agriculture, e.g., the abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) in 1958; c) a greater use of price incentives; and d) a greater investment of capital for machinery, experimental farming and fertilizers.

The "Virgin Lands" Project

The most dramatic attempt made by Khrushchev to increase agricultural production has centered on efforts to settle and cultivate the sparsely populated lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia and elsewhere in Central Asia. Youth are encouraged to migrate to the new lands, to build up the undeveloped

frontier lands of the Soviet Union. Appeals to patriotism are combined with substantial economic incentives in the form of loans, subsidies and outright grants. Since forced labor is no longer a factor of economic significance, workers must be recruited via the voluntary method. Thus, demobilized military personnel are offered as much as 600 rubles (about \$150 at the official rate of exchange) to settle in Siberia.

Now more than five years old, the program has had mixed success. The 1957 production figures for the virgin lands reflected the widespread drought that afflicted the area and brought into question the continued feasibility of Khrushchev's gamble; 1958, however, proved a banner year, again a partial reflection of climatic vagaries, only this time the rains came and the weather was favorable; 1959 witnessed a decrease from the record harvest of the previous year; final returns for 1960 are not yet in, but preliminary indications are that production will not reach the planned levels.

Since 1954, more than 100 million acres of uncultivated land have been sown. According to Soviet statistics, the total grain harvest has increased by 50 per cent over 1953. Under the 1959-1965 Seven Year Plan an increase of 70 per cent for agricultural produce is planned. This increment may be overly optimistic, depending as it does on favorable weather, continually rising levels of efficiency, and the effective utilization of capital and labor.

The scope of the virgin lands program can be seen in the ambitious corn growing program initiated in early 1955. In 1954, 10 million acres were devoted to corn; in 1955, 44 million; in 1956, 58 million; and the planned acreage for 1960 is 75 million. The virgin lands project has helped to raise the level of total Soviet agricultural production sufficiently to make available to the average Soviet citizen more and varied food products at lower prices.

Institutional Changes

On January 22, 1958, Premier Khrushchev proposed the gradual abolition of the Machine Tractor Stations, an institution long used by the Party to control a recalcitrant peasantry. In 1952, Stalin had vigorously opposed such a move as a step away from

communism, holding that "the effect would be to involve the collective farms in heavy loss and to ruin them; to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to slow-up the development of collective-farm production." Stalin argued that under such a proposal:

... the collective farms would become the owners of the basic instruments of production; that is, their status would be an exceptional one, such as is not shared by any other enterprise in our country; . . . Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?

On another occasion, Khrushchev, too, had cited the need for the MTS, referring to it as "the fortress of the State in the country."

The MTS was a state-operated enterprise which provided all the tractors, combines, harvesters and other farm machinery used on the collective farms (there were approximately 8,500 in 1958). The machinery was rented to the kolkhoz, thus institutionalizing the peasant's dependence on the state. The kolkhoz was not permitted to own its own machinery for this would have given the peasant a degree of autonomy from Party domination and weakened planning controls. Why, then, the change?

The reasons are complex and closely interrelated. First, the elimination of the MTS was motivated by economic considerations: the desire to make agriculture more efficient, to end duplication and waste in management, and to induce the peasant to raise farm productivity. In particular, the state no longer depends upon the MTS to accumulate grains as payment for services rendered. Instead of being paid in kind by the collective farms for the use of farm machinery, the state now finds it cheaper to obtain most of its agricultural products from state farms (the sovkhozy now constitute 25 per cent of Soviet agriculture, compared with the 10-15 per cent figure in 1952), and from direct purchases from the collectives.

Second, the opposition of the peasantry to the regime, so prevalent during the 1930's and 1940's, has been muted sufficiently in recent years to give the regime confidence in its ability to regulate agriculture by use of

the carrot rather than the stick. Khrushchev paid tribute to the past work of the MTS for having "facilitated the changeover from individual peasant farming to collective farming." At the same time, he noted that there was no need now "to assign to the machine and tractor stations the role of organizers of production." In the early years after collectivization, when the collectives were relatively small, the state used the MTS to check on operations and output of the farms and to make sure that the state was receiving all the produce owed to it. The police and political functions of the MTS are no longer significant for "today they have no one to convince of the advantages of large-scale machine farming."

Finally, the dissolution of the MTS weakened the position of the bureaucracy which, under Stalin, dominated Soviet economic life from Moscow. This reform, coupled with the far-reaching reorganization of industry, another Khrushchev innovation, has served to strengthen still further the power of the Party *vis-à-vis* the other key institutions of political significance, i.e., the bureaucracy; the secret police and the military. Today, for the first time since the 1920's, the Party truly holds the reins of power.

The Khrushchev proposal was formally promulgated on April 20, 1958. It outlined the steps by which collective farms could purchase and operate their own machinery and by which the MTS would be converted into Repair and Technical Service Stations (RTS), which would supply spare parts and technical advice to the kolkhozy. Various Party and governmental factions opposed this reform on economic and ideological grounds and may continue to do so. Khrushchev's tenure at the top rests, in part, on the success of this measure, and indeed on the success of the many other agricultural reforms with which he has been intimately associated.

The Emphasis on Private Profit

To encourage the peasant to produce, Moscow has resorted to a singularly unsocialistic incentive: the desire for private profit. The concessions cover a wide area: compulsory deliveries of farm produce by the collectives were ended (these were long a major grievance of the peasants for they

required that the bulk of the peasants' produce be delivered to the state at prices far below market prices); the prices paid by the state for farm produce have been increased; and the peasant has been granted greater latitude in the disposal of his privately raised produce. The government hopes by these measures to raise the cash income of the peasants and to promote thereby an increase in the nation's food supply.

Government Competition

At the same time, the government has entered more purposefully into competition with the collective farms. It announced, late in 1958, that the state farms were going to compete with the collectives more vigorously in the future through more efficient utilization of fertilizers, modern farming techniques, and capital investment, by increasing productivity and by providing the consumer with fruits and vegetables at lower prices. If successful, this would be a boon to the urban dweller. However, the government has sought rather unsuccessfully in the past to bring about such conditions, and in the end it has always been forced to rely on the collectives.

Increased Capital Investment

Under Stalin the agricultural sector was a neglected area for capital investment. Khrushchev has acted to reverse this condition. Through the widespread use of fertilizers and pesticides, a more rational use of machinery, and increased mechanization, he hopes to bring about dramatic rises in productivity. On October 28, 1959, Alexei Kosygin, a First Deputy Premier of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), reported to the Supreme Soviet that "the state is allocating more than 19,000 million rubles for capital investment in agriculture in 1960, including over 2,000 million rubles for hydro-projects and approximately the same amount for the construction of grain receiving stations." Of the total capital investment planned for the current Seven Year Plan, about 20-25 per cent will be devoted to agriculture.

Conclusion

In December, 1959, the Central Commit-

tee of the C.P.S.U. met to discuss the unsatisfactory condition of agriculture. The 1959 production figures were well below 1958 levels. Various explanations were offered: poor planning and organization by local officials, bad weather, and so on. Meanwhile, the quest for a suitable formula to raise agricultural production goes on.

The United States Department of Agriculture sent six technical study groups to the Soviet Union in 1958 as part of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural exchange program. The agricultural economists prepared a report on the *Economic Aspects of Soviet Agriculture*. A number of their observations may be noted:

1. Although the Soviet Union has experienced difficulty in the past in providing for the food needs of its population, this situation is being remedied. "The national diet has improved gradually in recent years and it is expected to improve further."

2. Despite a growing measure of mechanization, excessive bureaucratic controls and lack of incentives have hampered production yields. "Fragmentary evidence suggests that farm output per worker is only about one-fourth as high as in the United States."

3. "Central planning and supervision of agriculture, although less centralized than in earlier years, permit the marshalling of all available resources to achieve a specific goal. Large-scale efforts of this type can achieve startling results such as the 90-million-acre new lands program. They can also produce costly mistakes. . . . Recent changes in farm programs, however, seem to give increasing emphasis to cost reduction, economy of operation, and greater incentives for individual effort in both work performance and management."

4. The experts concluded that the U.S.S.R. "has potentialities for increasing

both farm output and production efficiency if the authorities decide to do it. The methods used will be vastly different from ours, but past experience indicates that progress should be expected."

Any appraisal of contemporary Soviet agriculture must be tentative in character; speculation about the future must be even more so. Stalin's successors have introduced major agricultural reforms. Indeed, Khrushchev's "revisionism" may well have implications for Soviet society the outlines of which are not yet apparent.

It is unlikely that the peasant will again be made to bear a disproportionate share of the national burden. Though turnabouts have happened before in Soviet policy, any objective appraisal must acknowledge the promising advances being made in agriculture. For the peasant, they have meant a modest improvement in his standard of living and the expectation that this pattern of greater cash payments for performance and added opportunities for individual gain *within* the framework of a collectivized agriculture will continue. He has made his adjustment to collectivization, or so it would seem. For the government, the goals remain a completely communistic agriculture and plenty for all. At present, these goals are incompatible. The government has therefore attempted to work out a compromise with the peasant. In return for a larger slice of the national income, the peasant will produce more. As the pie grows larger, this arrangement could serve the desires of both. But the main question remains unanswered, and its answer is important not only for the Soviet Union but for the entire Communist bloc: will the peasant produce as much and as efficiently for the state as he would for himself?

"Throughout the world, today, the word 'democracy' is a rallying cry. It expresses men's basic desires for dignity and the fullest utilization of human potential. The concept of democracy, indeed the word itself, is a source of such powerful inspiration that even its greatest enemies cynically attempt to use it by designating themselves 'people's democracy.'

"... To keep faith with ourselves, to live up to our national ideal, we must be unremitting in our efforts to secure to all our citizens the full opportunity to exercise those basic rights which are the common heritage of all free peoples."

—William P. Rogers, Attorney General of the United States, in an address delivered on February 8, 1960.

Received At Our Desk

THE GREAT CONTEST. RUSSIA AND THE WEST. BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (N.Y. and London: Oxford University Press, 1960. 86 pages and index, \$2.75.)

In this concise, if brief, examination of post-Stalin Russia, Isaac Deutscher, a leading authority on Soviet politics and history, analyzes the trends and currents which characterize Khrushchev's regime. In Deutscher's view, the Khrushchev era has produced a new atmosphere in Soviet Russia. De-Stalinization has broken down the rigid police state set up under Stalin. Along with a more relaxed society and administrative reorganization has come increased efficiency.

At issue presently is the growing ability of the Soviet Union to match the West in industrial production and in raising the living standards of its populace. The Soviets now believe that they will undoubtedly predominate under prolonged competitive coexistence: ". . . Western capitalism will succumb not so much—or not directly—because of its own crises and inherent contradictions as because of its inability to match the achievements of socialism." Deutscher interprets Soviet economic advances as shifting the balance of power in favor of the Russians "without changing the formal *status quo*."

Deutscher points out that Soviet progress in the 1960's will be phenomenal. His predictions of the freedom and high cultural values that will triumph in Soviet Russia, as concomitants of high economic development, are exceedingly optimistic; the author bases this belief in the eventual development of political liberty on the ground that "The Russians have already discovered that they need freedom, if only to be socially efficient."

His description of Khrushchev's achievements are an impressive, if one-sided list. The Russian people regard Khrushchev, in Deutscher's view, as "trying hard to

make good Stalin's and Molotov's mistakes. His approach and language are reasonably conciliatory; he has cut down the size of the Soviet Union's armed forces; he was the first to stop nuclear tests; he has wound up some of the Soviet military bases abroad; he took the initiative to evacuate Austria; he has exerted himself to stop the civil war in Indo-China; he has despite opposition at home and many snubs from abroad, stubbornly persisted in his attempts to renew contacts with the leaders of the West; and he has been to the United States to proclaim the Soviet Union's desire for peace and to produce what they believe to be *the* master scheme of international disarmament. They [the people] now watch anxiously to see the result of Khrushchev's initiatives. If he achieves nothing, they will be confirmed in their worst suspicions of the West. . . ."

Not in accord with the author's sharp analysis of Soviet progress is the challenge he meekly lays before the Western powers: "If only the West learns to face the future instead of clinging to the past, the challenge will hold no threat to it; and—who knows?—competitive coexistence may yet change from the bitter competition it is into co-operative emulation. This certainly is the only hope. . . ."

All in all, Deutscher has presented a picture of a new Soviet social order in which he sees a rejuvenation of human values and the human element. He has many penetrating insights to offer on the threat of Soviet dynamism to Western culture.

J.L.B.

THE MIND OF GERMANY. THE EDUCATION OF A NATION. BY HANS KOHN. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. 370 pages and index, \$5.95.)

This volume is an exciting contribution to an understanding of Germany history

and its destructive political ambitions. Hans Kohn, a prominent historian and author of many books on nationalism, traces the growth of anti-Western elements in German intellectual life and in German national attitudes. According to Kohn, in his sensitive and profound account of Germany's tragic destiny, under scrutiny is "the question whether German history has formed the German character or whether the character of the Germans has influenced the course of their history. . . ."

In a coherent and cogent answer to his self-imposed query: "how the alienation of Germany from the West came about?" the author states that there was a "... specific German intellectual and political heritage which made the Germans acclaim Hitler's rise to power. Germany did not succumb to Hitler because she had become part of modern western society; she succumbed because this modern society had been imposed on pre-modern social and intellectual foundations which were proudly retained."

The author discusses the expansion of Germany's nationalistic monomania, "this nation-centered self-glorification," as this idea was expounded by German historians, writers and statesmen. For the most part, Germany's autocratic society rejected the new values introduced with the Enlightenment. Rather, the Germans were strongly influenced by the Romantic Movement. German romanticism, asserts Kohn, "... did its best to poeticize and romanticize the German concept of the state. It never developed a program for a modern German nation-state; however with its emphasis on the great depth of the German mind it led to a growth of a consciousness of German uniqueness and to the belief that a nation may be a law unto itself."

This is the point which Kohn elaborates in showing the reader the continuing thread of anti-Westernism in German thought, which led to eventual, if not inevitable, tragedy for both itself and the world. Kohn succinctly states that it was Germany's "'war against the West'" that produced wholesale devastation and tragedy. As the author further expands

on his theme of anti-Western Germanophilism, he declares that "German romantic thought . . . had led to dangerous consequences because it was not balanced by an awareness of supranational values."

It is in the present German Federal Republic, "the first consolidated German democracy," that Kohn places his hopes for the final and complete rejection of Germany's Bismarckian and militarist heritage.

This book is obviously the work of a gifted historian and deserves much attention by those who are interested in understanding and preserving Western values. Kohn has produced a fascinating historical account of Germany's intellectual and political alienation. In richness of material, depth and scope, and excellence of writing, this book is unsurpassed. The author's sensitivity, his feeling for Germany's super-intellectual and dynamic powers and the destructiveness that lay therein, lead to an affirmation, by both author and reader, of Western values, in particular political liberty. J.L.B.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS. BY L. K. HYDE, JR. (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1960. 249 pages with index, \$3.00.)

Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this volume is one of a series of "National Studies on International Organization."

Roughly sketching in the background of American political theory, the author elaborates on how the United States political philosophy affected its attitude and role in the United Nations. Hyde does not attempt to study the United States political behavior in the United Nations; this book is exclusively devoted to examining the influence of the United States in expanding the social welfare functions of the United Nations. Hyde traces United States action in promoting the welfare of the world in three areas: refugee assistance; technical and economic development; and assuring human rights. As Hyde himself declares, this volume il-

illustrates how the United States tried to extend social and economic benefits, "notably where the United Nations was employed as an instrumentality."

In his conclusion the author warns that this "missionizing zeal" creates misunderstanding abroad, and that it "must be tempered." This is a useful study of the growth of American international-mindedness.
J.L.B.

SOVIET ECONOMIC POWER. By ROBERT W. CAMPBELL. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960. 209 pages and index, \$4.75.)

In this discussion of the growth of the Soviet economy, Robert Campbell presents complex economic analyses and comparisons in terms readily comprehensible. In interpreting the rate of expansion in the Soviet economy, the author points out that the Soviet economy has advanced to the point where it really poses a serious challenge to the West. As the author warns, "... it can indeed be shown that many kinds of productivity are rising more rapidly in the Soviet economy than in the American. This means that the Soviet leaders can look forward to great possibilities for economic growth just by improving productivity. Even if there should be a slowdown in the rate at which they can expand their capital, their labor force, and the area they use for agriculture, this can be offset by big increases in productivity, by getting more output from a given amount of resources."

Chapter Two on the "Ideological and Historical Background" is an interesting picture of the fight within the Communist party on the New Economic Policy and on the rate at which industrialization should be pushed.

This book will prove most beneficial to the student and the lay reader; it provides full explanations of economic terms and calculations as they have been employed. The author has supplied a detailed and portentous view of the dynamism of the Soviet economic system. He proves well his thesis that the planned economy is far from stagnant.
J.L.B.

TREATY MAKING POWER. By HANS BLIX. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger and London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1960. 414 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.00.)

As stated by the author in the Preface, this study is limited primarily to "a systematic examination of those rules of international law which relate to the identification of the authorities in the state who are competent to express the final consent of the state to a treaty." It is not, therefore, another general work on the law of treaties. The material is divided into two major sections. The first deals with the question of the competence of agents of treaty-making organs and the second deals with the question of the competence of the treaty-making organs themselves. The second section is further subdivided into two parts, one dealing with cases where state law does not regulate the treaty-making competence and the other dealing with the more common situation where such regulation is present.

The author has succeeded in presenting a well organized and well documented study of this important subject. Although his conclusions appear to be a trifle short, they are pertinent. While the price of the book alone would tend to keep it out of the hands of the casual reader, it has a definite place in the library of the specialist in international law.

GEORGE A. CODDING, JR.
University of Pennsylvania

COMMUNISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS. By DAVID J. SAPOSS. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. 259 pages and index, \$5.00.)

The Communist party has never been an important factor in American political life; nonetheless, it is a fitting subject for analysis. Eternal vigilance is the price of democracy, and a clear understanding of the dangers which continually threaten from within is demanded of all responsible citizens.

David J. Saposs, a long-time student of Communist activities, has written a detailed, informative account of the impact

and efforts of communism in American political life. The book is divided into five parts. Part I deals briefly with the early years of the Communist party. Part II provides two interesting case studies of attempts by the Communists to infiltrate the established political parties in Washington and California. Part III deals with Communist efforts to infiltrate and subvert the labor movement. Particular attention is given to the rise and decline of the American Labor party. Part IV is devoted to post World War II development: the Progressive party movement, the dilemma of the liberals, and the controversies attending the 1948 election. The final section discusses the condition of contemporary communism in the United States, its tactics and tribulations.

Careful research and clear exposition make this a useful treatise on a persistent problem. However, the concluding sections are not so speculative and stimulating as one might wish.

G.A.C.

THE IDEA OF CONTINENTAL UNION. AGITATION FOR THE ANNEXATION OF CANADA TO THE UNITED STATES 1849-1893. By DONALD F. WARNER. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press for the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, 1960. 276 pages and index, \$5.00.)

In this study, Donald F. Warner traces the development of the movement for annexation, which influenced and helped shape the course of Canadian development. Although there were supporters of union with Canada in the United States, the movement had a firmer and wider grasp in the Canadian provinces.

The central focus of the book is on the Canadian side of the border, consequently. Annexation was used as a political tool in negotiations with Britain for gaining independent, dominion status for Canada. As Warner states, "It is no accident that Canada has been the bellwether leading the way up the slow and tortuous path to dominion status and practical independence for a large section of the British Empire. The presence of the United States

gave Canada a potential alternative to British rule and curbed any inclination of Imperial officials to deal brusquely with their American dependencies."

On the other hand, Warner claims that annexation between Canada and the United States was natural, and that the creation of two separate entities has been to fight that natural development. Geographically and ethnically the two nations are linked. From time to time, he asserts, union was also motivated by business recession: "The mainspring of the annexation agitation was always economic distress, coupled with the melancholy conviction that Canada lacked, and would never have, the ingredients of a viable national economy."

This book provides a full and rich history of Canadian politics in the second half of the nineteenth century, and the politics behind the federation of this dominion. It received the American Studies Series award presented by the Mississippi Valley Historical Association. J.L.B.

AN APPROACH TO SANITY: A STUDY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. By FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY. (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1960. 94 pages, \$2.75.)

Since his retirement from the post of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Viscount Montgomery, one of Britain's great wartime military leaders, has spoken and written frequently and critically of Western policies. Though generals do not always make wise political commentators or statesmen, Viscount Montgomery has some penetrating things to say. In his short book, *An Approach to Sanity: A Study of East-West Relations*, he has forcefully expressed his ideas on contemporary world affairs. He is critical of Nato, contending that it has become "a sort of mutual-congratulation society, thinking all is well and refusing to face facts." He believes that a major overhaul of the entire organization is in order.

In blunt, unambiguous language, Vis-

count Montgomery calls for a United Nations solution to the Berlin problem. Thus far, neither the West nor the Soviet Union has been willing to entertain such an approach seriously. Yet, in the over-all perspective of possible alternatives, it may very well be the most practical interim solution to the most immediate problem threatening European security.

Finally, he calls for a more comprehensive, consistent, and unified approach to the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa. In this respect, he holds that Nato's outlook "has not been global during the past years. The difficulty is that there is in Nato a large group of nations with purely parochial interests which are confined to the Nato area. There is another and smaller group with world-wide interests. It has not been possible to hammer out a common policy between these two groups." Nato must devote more attention to the task of developing firm, stable links with the non-Nato world.

A.Z.R.

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY, 1924-1926. Volume II. By EDWARD HALLETT CARR. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. 493 pages and index, \$7.50).

This is the sixth of Edward Hallett Carr's projected ten volume study of **A HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA**. The first four volumes dealt with the Lenin era. The present study is the second of three dealing with the 1924-1926 period. Like the earlier volumes, this one bears the imprint of scholarship, sophistication and sound analysis.

The first half deals with "The Struggle in the Party": with the Stalin-Trotsky struggle, with the role of Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other key leaders who were to meet their deaths in the Stalin purges of the 1930's; it develops the principal disputes among the contestants for power and illumines the controversies which lay behind the ideological rationalizations. Mr. Carr relies upon official documents and has the rare gift of extracting phrases and brief selections which give the reader the substance of the document.

The second half of the book deals with "The Soviet Order": the establishment

and organization of the Union Republics, the problems involved in restoring vitality to local units of government, and, in particular, the controversy which raged within the army between the political commissars and the military commanders.

Mr. Carr has meticulously examined all available Soviet materials and brought clarity to a complex subject. All students of Soviet affairs are indebted to him for his monumental works. In a period of "team" and group study projects, Mr. Carr's individual labors stand out among the most outstanding contributions being made.

A.Z.R.

AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY. EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON. (New York: Random House, 1960. 756 pages and index, \$6.50).

This anthology is a welcome and refreshing change from the uneven run-of-the-mill compilations which glut the textbook market in American foreign policy and in international relations. It has been put together with obvious care, forethought and sophistication. As such, it should find a ready market in many a college classroom.

Professor Jacobson, in order "to assist in clarifying and raising the level of public debate," has drawn upon the best writings of outstanding specialists and made them available in this neat package. He has organized the material into 14 chapters, covering such topics as "The Democratic Process," "The Nature of Foreign Policy," "The Challenge of Soviet Communism," "The Recognition of Communist China," "Colonialism" and "The United Nations." The anthology is well-organized. "After presenting selections dealing with the framework of policy-making and the contemporary environment of world politics, it juxtaposes contrasting and at times conflicting analyses of present foreign policy problems in the hope that their intellectual substructure will thereby be made more apparent." The brief introductory notes by the author provide useful transitions from one topic to another.

A.Z.R.

Current Documents

KHRUSHCHEV SPEAKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SEPTEMBER, 1960

On September 23, 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, heading the Russian delegation to the opening of the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, addressed the member states.

Decrying Western imperialism and urging that the United Nations take action to end colonialism throughout the world, the Soviet Premier also asked the General Assembly to discuss the disarmament proposals in plenary session. In a radical proposal, Khrushchev recommended a reorganization of the United Nations structure that would replace the Secretary Generalship with a triumvirate. Major excerpts from this four part speech follow:

Mr. President, esteemed delegates:

It is my belief that everyone who comes to this rostrum and casts a glance at this hall is aware that he is addressing a very distinguished and responsible assembly.

There is no more responsible gathering of representatives of states than this one should be. It is not in vain that it is called the General Assembly of the United Nations. There is no need for me to decipher the meaning of the name our organization bears. I would just like to stress two words out of several others, these are united nations. Many nations are represented in this hall and they should be united not just by the walls of this hall, but by the common lofty interests of mankind.

Today there are gathered here to discuss major international issues the representatives of now almost a hundred states. Soon we will have amongst us the delegates of new members of the United Nations Organization, and the walls of this hall will, as it were, recede and it will house an even greater number of lands and countries. We must, all of us, welcome this development because we want truly all states to be represented in the United Nations.

* * *

This dispute-filled and complicated line of international relationships came into being neither today nor yesterday. Two points of view regarding world developments plainly opposed one another already in the first post-

war years. One line aimed at an international detente, at ending the arms race, at the development of international cooperation, and the exclusion of war from the life of society. . . .

There is, however, a second line, and we have no right to pass over it in silence. This is a line aimed at fanning the "cold war." It leads to an unchecked build-up of armaments, to the destruction of all the foundations of international cooperation with all the ensuing dangerous consequences.

Two lines in international relationships have been in contest since long ago. But if in elementary geometry parallel lines can never meet, in international affairs these lines may collide. And this would be a fearful moment. Just ten or fifteen years ago hardly anyone could foresee the outcome of the struggle between these two lines in international policies.

In 1960, however, a year in which you and I are living, only the blind will not see the way in which the belief in the necessity of preserving peace is ever more definitely and plainly taking root in the minds of the majority of nations.

* * *

I. The policy of preparing war and violating the sovereign rights of the nations must be condemned and halted.

A year ago I already had the honor of speaking from this lofty rostrum. That was a time when highly promising prospects for

the invigoration of the international atmosphere had been opened up before mankind. Contacts between responsible statesmen from various countries of the world were expanding. The General Assembly adopted a resolution on general and complete disarmament. The Ten Nation Disarmament Committee began its work. Agreement was reached on a Summit Conference. Certain progress was made in the talks on the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. All this instilled great hopes into the hearts of people in all countries.

No one can dispute the fact that the Soviet Union has never spared any effort to make international relations continue further to develop in this gratifying direction. However, the sinister forces who profit by maintaining international tension cling hard to their positions. . . .

* * *

We came up against a dangerous manifestation of the activities of these forces last spring when the aircraft of one of the largest of the United Nations member states, namely the United States, perfidiously invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and other states. Moreover, the United States has promoted such violation of international law into a principle of deliberately pursued state policy.

* * *

The United Nations cannot fail to heed the ever more insistent demands of the peoples who are alarmed by the sallies of the enemies of peace. The forms and results of the popular movement for peace and international cooperation in various countries are different, but its meaning, causes and aims are the same: it is a movement of protest against the policy of war and provocations, against the back-breaking arms race, against the foisting upon the nations of a will that is alien and inimical to them.

* * *

How ridiculous and absurd are the arguments with which the aggressors have been covering up their actions. They alleged that "chaos" would reign in the Congo if the Belgian troops had not marched in, that the Congolese people had not yet matured for independent nationhood. Who could believe these allegations? The Africans have

a saying which runs: "To cheat the people is just the same as to try to wrap fire in paper." Armed aggression against the Congo has been condemned by the whole of Africa, by world-wide public opinion.

And of course, it was not concern for the life of Belgian citizens in the Congo but the far more tangible interests of the all-powerful monopolies which have taken root on Congolese land that prompted the Belgian Government to undertake the reckless attempt to bring the people of this young state to their knees, to tear away by force its richest province of Katanga. Raw materials for nuclear weapons—uranium, cobalt, titanium, cheap labor—that is what the monopolists are afraid of losing in the Congo. This is what constitutes the genuine basis of their conspiracy against the Congo the strings of which extend from Brussels to the capitals of other major Nato powers.

* * *

Some organs of the United States and British press, encouraged by certain forces, clamor about an alleged Soviet defeat in the Congo.

What can one say of such unwise allegations? First of all, we did not and could not sustain any defeat in the Congo because there neither were nor could there have been any troops of ours or any interference on our part in the internal affairs of the Congo.

It has been and will always be our stand that the peoples of Africa, like those of other continents, striving for their liberation from the colonial yoke, should establish orders in their countries of their own will and choice.

Secondly, we have always opposed and will oppose any interference by imperialists in the internal affairs of the countries liberating themselves from colonial dependence, as well as such unworthy methods as were used in the Congo.

* * *

The United Nations Organization should demand the reestablishment of order in the Congo so that the Parliament legally elected by the Congolese people can function, so that conditions [can] be created for the normal activities of the legitimate government of the Congo which is headed by Mr. Lumumba and which has and is enjoying the confidence of the Congolese people.

The Soviet Government has placed the Congo question on the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. The Assembly should give a rebuff to the colonialists and their stooges and call Mr. Hammarskjöld to order so that he should not abuse his position as Secretary General and should discharge his duties in strict conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the decisions of the Security Council.

It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that a decision should be taken that only the troops of the countries of Africa and Asia should be left in the Congo, those troops remaining there only with the consent of the legally elected Congolese government of Mr. Lumumba and being used only at the discretion of this government in the interests of ensuring the normal functioning of the legitimate government and Parliament of the Congo Republic. All states which in deeds and not in words want to see the Congo free and independent should refrain from any action which could lead to an infringement of the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of the Congo.

* * *

Unfortunately, the policy of violating the integral rights of the peoples is still to be felt in the United Nations itself. Just take the question of the representation in the United Nations of the great People's China. To block the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations only because the socialist order in that country is not to the liking of the ruling quarters of certain Western countries, and, first and foremost, the United States, means to ignore reality, not to desire any easing of international tension and to sacrifice the interests of consolidating international peace and the development of international cooperation for the sake of the narrow political designs of a small group of states. Such a situation is harmful for the cause of peace and humiliating for the United Nations.

This is also attested to by the history of the question of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to United Nations membership. As you know, this question has been discussed time and again for many years. The Mongolian People's Republic, however, up to now, has not been admitted

to the United Nations. We believe that it is high time to settle this question and admit the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations so that she could participate on an equal footing with the other sovereign states in the discussion and solution of vital international problems.

* * *

II. The Colonial regime must be completely and finally eliminated.

Fellow delegates,

* * *

The Soviet Union faithful to the policy of peace and support to the struggle of oppressed peoples for their national independence which was proclaimed by V. I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state, is urging the United Nations to raise its voice in defense of the just cause of liberating the colonies, and to undertake prompt action towards the complete elimination of the colonial regime of administration.

Complete and final elimination of the colonial regime in all its forms and manifestations has been prompted by the entire course of world history in the last decades. This regime is doomed and its death is a matter of time. Practically the question now is whether the burial of the colonial regime will be quiet or whether it will be accompanied by dangerous gambles by the supporters of colonialism who clutch at extreme measures. The events in the Congo are a fresh reminder of existing dangers.

* * *

Firmly adhering to the principle that the United Nations is the center for coordinating the actions of nations in achieving the universal aims proclaimed in its Charter, the Soviet Government submits for consideration by this session of the General Assembly a draft declaration in which the following demands are solemnly proclaimed:

1. To grant immediately to all colonial countries, trusteeship territories and other non-selfgoverning territories complete independence and freedom in the building up of their own national states in conformity with the freely expressed will and desire of their peoples. The colonial regime, colonial administration in all its forms should be abolished completely so as to make it possible for

the peoples of such territories to determine their destiny and form of government.

2. To eliminate likewise all strongholds of colonialism in the shape of possessions and leasehold areas on the territories of other states.

3. The governments of all countries are called upon to observe strictly and consistently the provisions of the United Nations Charter and of this declaration relating to equality and respect for sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all states without exception allowing no manifestations of colonialism, no exclusive rights or advantages for some states to the prejudice of other states.

Being convinced that the complete elimination of the regime of colonial administration will be a noble act of genuine humanness, a great stride forward on the way of civilization and progress, we ardently urge all governments represented in the United Nations to support the provisions of this declaration.

The draft declaration prepared by the Soviet Government and submitted for your attention outlines in detail the considerations by which we were guided in raising this question at the General Assembly. We request that this draft declaration be circulated as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly.

In this statement made in the general debate I should also like to make the following points:

The adoption by the United Nations of measures for the complete elimination of the colonial regime would not only create favorable conditions for localizing and cooling the existing cauldrons of military danger where an armed struggle between the colonialists and the peoples fighting for their independence is being waged, but would also greatly diminish the possibility of new military conflicts between states in these areas of the world. The peoples of the countries who are now suffering from humiliations brought about by foreign domination would gain a clear prospect of peaceful liberation from the foreign yoke, and the states clinging to their colonial possessions would be held responsible to the United Nations, to the world public opinion for the implementation of the provisions of the proposed declaration. Of course, such a prospect will become reality only in

the event that the colonial powers do not evade the implementation of the United Nations decisions.

* * *

We welcome the sacred struggle of the colonial peoples against the colonialists and for their liberation. If the colonial powers do not heed the voice of reason and continue their old colonial policy of keeping colonial countries in subjugation, the peoples who stand on the positions of eliminating the colonial regime should render all-out assistance to the fighters for their independence against colonialism, against colonial slavery. Moral, material and other assistance should be rendered for the completion of the sacred and just struggle of the peoples for their independence.

* * *

III. The disarmament problem should at last be solved.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen! Last September on the instructions of the Soviet Government I submitted to the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the proposals of the Soviet Union on general and complete disarmament. The enormous destructive power of modern weapons, the unprecedented scope of the arms race, the accumulation by states of huge stockpiles of the weapons of mass extermination all create a threat to the future of mankind and make it imperative to seek an approach, new in principle, to the disarmament problem. Our proposals are the practical expression of such an approach.

One could not but experience a feeling of gratification due to the fact that the ideas raised by us were unanimously approved by the United Nations and received wide support by the peoples of the whole world. Being guided by the resolution of the last session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union together with other states took the most active part in the negotiations in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament and bent its efforts in it to elaborate a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Without waiting for an international agreement on the question of disarmament the Soviet Union is implementing unilaterally a reduction of its armed forces by 1,200,000 men,

i.e., by one-third, which is generally recognized to have contributed to improving the atmosphere for the negotiations on disarmament.

The Soviet Government consistently and determinedly pursuing a peaceful policy solemnly declares at this session of the U. N. General Assembly that the Soviet Union maintains its armed forces only for the defense of our country and for the fulfillment of obligations to our allies and friends in case of aggression against them. The possibility of our armed forces being used for other purposes is ruled out since this would be alien to the very nature of our state and to the fundamental principles of its peaceful foreign policy.

Our country is compelled to maintain armed forces only for the reason that our proposals on complete and general disarmament have not yet been accepted. We shall do everything we can so that general and complete disarmament becomes reality and mankind is saved from the arms race and the threat of a new destructive war.

One year has elapsed since the General Assembly adopted the resolution on general and complete disarmament. By the present pace of life this is comparatively a long period. And there should be no doubt that those who are engaged in the production of arms, in modernizing and designing new death-dealing means have not wasted this time.

But in the sphere of disarmament no progress has been reached in the year that passed. What are the reasons for such a situation about which one has to speak with great regret and serious alarm? Who is hindering the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament—this perhaps the most important and outstanding decision in the history of the United Nations? Who is preventing the deadlock in the disarmament problem from being broken?

The facts prove that the lack of any progress in the solution of the disarmament problem is the consequence of the position taken by the United States and some other states connected with it through Nato.

Throughout the work of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee the Western powers refused to proceed to the working out of

an agreement on general and complete disarmament seeking by every possible means to evade a discussion of the substance of the Soviet program of general and complete disarmament transferred by the General Assembly to the Committee for detailed consideration. On their part they put forward proposals which provided neither for general nor complete disarmament, nor for disarmament at all, but only for measures of control over armaments, that is control without disarmament. However, one cannot fail to see that the establishment of control without disarmament would amount to the establishment of a system of international espionage, and not only would it fail to promote the consolidation of peace but might, on the contrary, aid a potential aggressor in carrying out his plans that are dangerous for the peoples.

The danger lies in the fact that the establishment of control over armaments if armaments are retained means in effect that both one and the other side will know the quantities, qualities and deployment of the armaments possessed by the opposing side. Consequently, an aggressor could increase his armaments to a superior level in order to choose a convenient opportunity and launch an attack. We will never accede to control over armaments without disarmament because this would mean encouraging the aggressor. Our goal is to ensure stable peace which can be achieved only through the elimination of armaments and armed forces under strict international control.

Acting contrary to the United Nations General Assembly resolution the Western powers in the Ten Nation Committee indulged in nothing but meaningless talk about disarmament trying to hinder any possible progress in this matter, and to discredit the idea of general and complete disarmament in the eyes of world public opinion.

* * *

That is why the Soviet Government has put the question of disarmament up for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly, the considerable majority of whose members is in no way interested in the arms race and sincerely wishes its termination. Taking into account the great importance of the disarmament problem and the necessity to make a radical change in the course of negotiations, the Soviet Government voiced the

opinion that in considering this question at the General Assembly the heads of state and government vested with the necessary power should directly participate. We note with gratification that this attitude was met with due understanding by the governments of quite a number of states whose delegations at the General Assembly are led by the most responsible statesmen of their countries.

Bringing the disarmament question to the plenary meetings of the General Assembly we proceed from the fact that consideration of this question in all its scope should lead, at last, to its solution or, at least, give a more concrete direction to the disarmament negotiations, in which there should now participate alongside with states belonging to the opposing military groupings the states adhering to a neutral course.

Seeking to facilitate the work of the General Assembly and to make the discussion of the disarmament problem more specific the Soviet Government submits for consideration by the General Assembly its proposal "Basic provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament." We request the President of the General Assembly and the U.N. Secretariat to circulate this proposal among the delegations as an official document of the General Assembly as well as our explanatory memorandum which presents the position of the Soviet Government on the disarmament problem in greater detail.

The new Soviet proposal on the question of general and complete disarmament which has as its basis the provisions of the Soviet Government's proposals of June 2, 1960, which were submitted for the consideration of all the governments of the world has been drawn up with due regard for all the useful points which were made during the past year in the course of the discussion of this question by political and public circles of various countries of the world. In many respects this proposal meets half way the position of the Western powers which, as we hope, will facilitate an early agreement on disarmament.

We now provide, in particular, for the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons to their target as early as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, include a detailed elaboration of

measures for effective international control in all the stages, take into account the wishes of some Western powers that the reduction of the strength of the armed forces and conventional armaments should be provided for from the outset. Quite a number of other changes and modifications were brought into our program. All these changes, in our opinion, make the program of general and complete disarmament more concrete and even more realistic and practicable.

* * *

The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that only a radical solution of the disarmament problem which would provide for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons together with the cessation of their manufacture and tests and the destruction of all accumulated stockpiles of these weapons can fully accord with the task of delivering mankind from the threat of nuclear war looming over it. That is precisely the goal which the Soviet Union is trying to achieve presently and resolutely [in] advocating general and complete disarmament.

All this, in our opinion, leads to an important conclusion: at last to break the deadlock in the disarmament problem the General Assembly should call to order those who impede the solution of the disarmament problem, who try to supplant businesslike negotiations on disarmament with meaningless beatings about the bush.

Objectively appraising the situation and the correlation of forces existing in the world the Soviet Government is deeply convinced that disarmament in our time is not only necessary but possible. . . .

The United Nations has no other more important and urgent task than to contribute to the cause of disarmament becoming a real fact and promoting at last the initiation of practical deeds, namely: the return of soldiers to their homes, the destruction of weapons including nuclear weapons and means of their delivery.

* * *

IV. Peaceful coexistence is the only sensible path for developing international relations in our time.

Ladies and gentlemen! The peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are unfailingly striving for the principles of

peaceful co-existence to be firmly established in relations between states, for these principles to become the cardinal law of life everywhere in present-day society. Underlying these principles is not some "gimmick" invented by the Communists but simple things dictated by life itself, namely that relations between all states should develop in a peaceful way, without resort to force, without wars, without interference in the internal affairs of one another.

I will not disclose a secret by saying that we entertain no liking for capitalism. But we do not want to foist our system upon other countries. So let those, who determine the policy of states whose social system differs from ours, also abandon their fruitless and dangerous attempts to dictate their will. It is high time for them too to admit that the choice of a way of life is the internal concern of every people. Let us build up our relations taking into consideration the actual facts of reality. This will mean peaceful co-existence.

* * *

It stands to reason that acceptance of the principles of peaceful co-existence does not mean that it is necessary to begin building up relations between states on a completely new basis. In fact, peaceful co-existence is already a reality and has found international recognition. The proof of this is that the General Assembly has twice in the recent time[s] adopted resolutions reaffirming the need for peaceful co-existence. . . .

In fact, the question now is how to make peaceful co-existence secure, how to prevent departures from it which now and then give rise to dangerous international conflicts. In other words, as I have already said once, the choice we have is not great: it is either peaceful co-existence which would promote the best human ideals or else co-existence "at dagger's point."

* * *

I think the ideas of peaceful co-existence may triumph even in those countries whose governments have not yet abandoned either hostile acts against the socialist states or rude pressure on non-committed states which pursue an independent policy. In these countries too the realization is growing of the danger of the "cold war" policy and the folly of balancing on the brink of the precipice.

* * *

. . . In our time it would be sheer nonsense if the two most powerful nations could not come to terms between themselves. This should be done at least in virtue of the great importance of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. for the destinies of the world. The Soviet Government is ready to go on doing its best to improve relations between our country and the United States of America.

The policy of peaceful co-existence presupposes willingness to solve all outstanding issues without resort to force by means of negotiations and reasonable concessions. Everyone knows that during the years of the "cold war" such questions chiefly did not find their solution which led to the creation of dangerous hotbeds of tension in Europe, Asia and in other parts of the world as well.

The international knots which are the heritage of the Second World War are still entangled. First and foremost among them stands the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the solution on this basis of the crucial question of West Berlin. If a peace treaty with Germany has not so far been concluded, this is completely on the conscience of the governments of the Western powers which, to speak without beating about the bush, have been sabotaging this problem in the course of many years. These governments have got into the habit of outright rejection of all the Soviet Union's proposals on a German peace treaty while at the same time they themselves over the fifteen years that have elapsed since the war did not find a suitable occasion to come forward with their own proposals in this respect.

As a result of this the situation in Europe remains unstable, fraught with the danger of acute conflicts. The absence of a peace treaty can gladden most of all the revanchist and militarist forces in West Germany. They are taking advantage of this so that step by step, they move forward toward the realization of their purposes which are dangerous for the cause of peace. At the time of the war in Korea, when the relations between the great powers were aggravated, they came forward with the question of creating the Bundeswehr and succeeded in this. Today we are the witnesses of the stirring up of the West German ruling circles who hope that

the present tense moment will allow them to pocket nuclear and rocket weapons.

... We believe that there exist objective conditions for an agreed solution of questions left open after the last war. As we have already stated, the Soviet Government is prepared to wait awhile with the solution of the question of a German peace treaty to try to achieve agreement on this treaty at the summit conference which the Soviet Union has proposed be held in a few months' time. We would like to hope that the Soviet Union's efforts in this direction will be supported also by the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France.

The Soviet Union believes that the solution of the Korean question is most essential for the consolidation of peace in the Far East and in the whole world.

* * *

The sole correct proposal to leave the solution of the question of the peaceful reunification of Korea to the Koreans themselves without any interference from outside finds evergrowing recognition. The necessary condition for this is the immediate and complete withdrawal of all American troops from South Korea whose presence poisons the atmosphere not only in Korea, but in the whole of the Far East and made possible such shameful facts as the falsification of elections in South Korea.

The proposal of the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic about a confederation of North and South Korea is as reasonable as the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on setting up a confederation between the two German states. This is the only way to a good start for the peaceful reunification of these states.

* * *

The experience of the work of the United Nations has demonstrated that this body is useful and necessary because in it are represented all states which are called upon to resolve the pressing issues of international relationships by negotiations so as not to bring them to such a state when conflicts and wars might break out. This is a positive aspect in the work of the United Nations. This, indeed, constitutes the main objective of the creation of the United Nations.

In the course of the United Nations ac-

tivities, however, some of its negative aspects also came to light. These negative aspects found their expression in the fact that so far certain countries succeed in imposing their will and their policy in the solution of specific matters in the United Nations to the detriment of other states. This does not further the basic goal of this Organization, does not promote the adoption of such decisions as would reflect the interests of all the countries making up the United Nations.

The executive machinery of the Organization is also constituted partially. It often approaches the solution of questions from the standpoint of a certain group of countries. This is particularly true of the activities of the United Nations Secretary General. As a rule the Western countries that make up the military blocs of the Western powers exploit this post in their interests by nominating for the post of United Nations Secretary General a candidate that is acceptable for [to] themselves. The result is that in many cases the practical routine work of the United Nations and of its Secretariat is in effect carried out one-sidedly. The personnel of the Organization is picked one-sidedly as well.

Partiality in the implementation of practical measures on the part of the United Nations was particularly manifested in the events that flared up in the Congo. Mr. Hammarskjöld, the Secretary General, in implementing the decisions of the Security Council in effect sided with the colonialists and with the countries that support the colonialists. This is a very dangerous thing.

We have come to the firm conclusion that the time has come to create conditions for a more effective work[ing] both of the United Nations as a whole and of this organization's executive working body. I repeat, the matter concerns primarily the Secretary General and his staff. The necessity of certain changes and improvements should particularly be borne in mind in the light of the immediate future.

For instance, we are now conducting negotiations on disarmament. For the time being the United States and its allies are doing their utmost to resist general and complete disarmament, and are seeking all sorts of pettifogging pretexts to thwart or at least stave off indefinitely the solution of the disarmament question. But we believe that

common sense will prevail and sooner or later all states will influence those who resist a reasonable solution of the disarmament problem. Therefore the United Nations machinery should already now be adapted to the conditions that will come into being in the course of the implementation of a disarmament decision.

An identical point of view has materialized in our proposals as well as in those of the countries making up the Nato military alignment regarding the necessity to follow up agreement on disarmament with the creation of armed forces of all countries under international control to be used by the United Nations as decided by the Security Council.

The Soviet Government believes that if the question of utilizing these international armed forces is approached correctly they really can be useful. But the experience of the Congo puts us on our guard. This experience indicates that the United Nations forces are being used precisely in the way against which we warned and which we resolutely oppose. The Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, has taken the stand of merely formal condemnation of the colonialists. In actual practice, however, he is pursuing the line of the colonialists, is opposing the legitimate Government of the Congo and the Congolese people, is supporting the renegades who, under the guise of fighting for the independence of the Republic of the Congo, are in fact continuing the policy of the colonialists and are apparently getting remuneration from them for their treachery.

... Provision should be made to guard against any state falling into the same predicament in which the Republic of the Congo now finds itself. We are sure that other states also understand this danger. Such solutions should therefore be sought as would exclude similar occurrences in the future.

The Soviet Government has come to a definite conclusion on this point and wishes to expound its point of view at the United Nations General Assembly. Conditions have obviously matured when the post of the Secretary General, who alone governs the staff and alone interprets and executes the decisions of the Security Council and sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, should be abolished. It is expedient to renounce the system under which all the prac-

tical work in the period between General Assembly sessions and Security Council meetings is determined by the Secretary General alone.

The executive body of the United Nations should reflect the actual situation that obtains in the world today. The United Nations includes states parties to the military blocs of the Western powers, socialist states and neutralist countries. This would therefore be completely justified, and we would be guaranteed to a greater extent against the negative developments which came to light in the work of the United Nations, especially during the recent events in the Congo.

We consider it reasonable and just for the executive body of the United Nations to be constituted not as one person—the Secretary General—but as three representatives of the states belonging to the three basic above-mentioned groups who could be invested with the lofty trust of the United Nations. The crux of the matter is not even in the name of this body but in that this executive body should represent the states parties to the military blocs of the Western powers, the socialist states, and the neutralist states. This composition of the United Nations executive body will create conditions for a more correct implementation of the decisions taken.

In brief, we consider it expedient to set up instead of a Secretary General who is presently the interpreter and executor of the Assembly and Security Council decisions, a collective executive body of the United Nations comprising three persons each of whom would represent a certain group of states. A definite guarantee would thereby be created that the work of the United Nations Executive would not be conducted to the detriment of any of these groups of states. Then the United Nations executive will really be a democratic body, it will really safeguard the interests of all United Nations member states irrespective of the social and political systems of the various states making up the United Nations. This is particularly necessary at the present time, and the more so will be in the future.

There exist other inconveniences as well which the United Nations members are now experiencing. These inconveniences are caused by the location of the United Nations

organization. It would seem that the United States of America, which calls itself a free democratic country, should do its utmost to facilitate the work of the United Nations, to create all necessary conditions for the representatives of states constituting this organization. Practice shows, however, that the United States restricts and curtails the rights of the representatives of various states. Facts are known, for instance, of the representatives of young African and Asian states being subjected to racial discrimination in the United States and, moreover, to attacks by gangsters.

* * *

The question arises of whether or not thought should be given to the choice of another locale for the United Nations Headquarters which would better facilitate the effective work[ing] of this international organization. Switzerland or Austria might well be such a place, for example. I can declare in all responsibility that if it should be considered expedient to house the United Nations Headquarters in the Soviet Union we guarantee the best possible conditions for its work, complete freedom and security for the representatives of all states irrespective of their political or religious convictions, and of the color of their skin. . . .

You all know that in the past the Soviet Government supported the proposal that the United States of America be chosen as the locale of the United Nations. However, latest developments show that the United States is evidently irked and burdened by this. Then perhaps the release of the United States from such a burden should be contemplated.

Ladies and gentlemen! Addressing the delegates to the United Nations General Assembly with the proposals on these essentially important questions of our time the Soviet Government would like to stress their specific extraordinary significance for the destiny of the world.

The importance of the disarmament problem requires no special proof. This question is of such vital importance that it, certainly, has to be discussed at the plenary session of the General Assembly.

The question of the elimination of the colonial regime is also so vital that the necessity of its discussion at the plenary session of the

General Assembly will apparently meet with full understanding by all the delegates.

We believe that especial importance has been acquired by the question of the aggressive actions of the United States against the Soviet Union which found their expression in the dispatch of American planes into Soviet air space. This is a fact which by itself goes beyond the limits of the relations between states admissible in time of peace. But this question assumes particular importance also for the reason that the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, himself declared the aggressive flights of the American planes a normal business allegedly necessary for the security of the United States. At the same time the United States Government arbitrarily assumed the right to send such planes in future. This is why since the matter concerns the violation of the sovereign rights not only of the Soviet Union but of other states as well the question of aggressive actions of the United States must be dealt with by the United Nations at its plenary session.

The continuation of such actions and especially their interpretation by the United States President as state policy can at any moment plunge mankind into a third world war. Therefore, I repeat, it is the opinion of the Soviet Government that this question as well as the questions of disarmament and the elimination of colonialism must be discussed at the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly and not in the committees.

* * *

Concluding my address I wish to emphasize once again that the Soviet Government, guided by the interests of the Soviet people, by the interests of the citizens of the free socialist state once again is proposing to all: let us talk, argue, but let us solve the questions of general and complete disarmament. Let us bury colonialism that has been condemned by mankind.

No further delay is tolerable, no further procrastination can be tolerated. The peoples of all states, irrespective of the social systems of these states are expecting the United Nations General Assembly at last to adopt decisions meeting the aspiration of the peoples.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Americas Conference on Economic Aid

- Sept. 5—The Americas conference on economic aid opens in Bogota. Cuba refuses to attend the opening session which the Cuban delegate terms "formal and purely routine." The Dominican Republic is not represented.
- Sept. 6—U.S. Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon reveals a U.S. program for extending liberal aid for a "broad new social development program for Latin America."
- Sept. 11—Nineteen American republics vote support for the Act of Bogota, a liberalized aid plan for Latin American social and economic development. Cuba does not support the plan.
- Sept. 12—The Americas conference closes.
- Sept. 13—Nineteen American republics sign the Act of Bogota.

Berlin Crisis

- Sept. 1—East Germany's 5-day closing of entry points into West Berlin from East Berlin and East Germany continues in effect through September 5. The prohibition does not apply to West Berliners, the Allied powers, or to foreigners.
- Sept. 5—The East German travel ban is lifted at midnight.
- East Germany stops 23 West German barges headed for West Berlin from Hamburg, carrying coal, cement and other items. The East German officials declare that the barges were too heavily laden to permit passage via the Havel River.
- Sept. 8—East Germany announces that travel by West Germans to East Berlin is under permanent restriction; West Germans seeking to enter East Berlin must first obtain a Communist police pass. The Allied powers declare that this is the most serious infringement to date of the four power agreement on Berlin.

East German Communist chief Walter

Ulbricht issues a demand for complete Allied troop evacuation from West Berlin by 1962.

Sept. 9—The U.S. firmly protests the East German travel ban and charges that the Soviet government must accept the responsibility for this step.

Sept. 11—The Allied powers in West Berlin order that no travel documents be issued to East German officials; these documents enable East Germans to travel in West European countries that do not recognize their government and will not issue them passports.

Sept. 13—East Germany announces that West German passports held by West Berliners will not be recognized.

The U.S.S.R. rejects Allied charges and declares that East Germany possesses "full legal sovereignty" over its territory.

Sept. 14—The West German Cabinet announces that West German businessmen will be prevented from participating in the Leipzig Fair in the spring of 1961.

Sept. 15—West Germany announces that it has documents, taken from an East German defector, which prove that East Germany is planning to wage all out war against the Bonn government.

Sept. 20—At a session of the steering committee of the Bundestag (lower house), the two leading political parties postpone convening the Bundestag in West Berlin until after January, 1961, after the inauguration of the new U.S. president.

Sept. 22—U.S. Ambassador to West Germany Walter C. Dowling travels from West Berlin to East Berlin. East Berlin Communist police ask for identification when he crosses into East Berlin territory.

Sept. 29—Allied officials announce that France, Britain and the U.S. will support West German economic reprisals against East Germany.

Sept. 30—At a meeting of the West German Cabinet it is decided to break off trade

relations with East Germany after January 1, 1961, unless East Germany lifts its restrictions on West German travel there. The official East Berlin press service announces that a break in the \$500 million trade agreement between the two governments might lead East Germany to cancel all West German ties.

European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven)

Sept. 1—British Under Secretary Frank E. Figgures arrives in Geneva as chief of the permanent staff of the Outer Seven organization. (See also *Finland, September 4.*)

Geneva Talks on Nuclear Test Ban

Sept. 27—Negotiations for a nuclear weapons test ban treaty resume in Geneva. The U.S. suggests a ban on smaller underground nuclear tests for 27 months.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Sept. 1—Negotiations open at Geneva among Gatt nations, who are concerned to lower trade barriers.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Sept. 5—Former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov arrives in Vienna to represent the U.S.S.R. at the I.A.E.A. sessions.

Sept. 12—U.S. Atomic Energy Commission chairman John A. McCone is named to lead the U.S. delegation to the Vienna conference of the I.A.E.A.

Sept. 17—Bulgarian Professor Georgi Nadjakov is named Chairman of the International Atomic Energy meeting.

Sept. 20—The fourth annual General Conference of the I.A.E.A. opens.

Sept. 21—Russian and U.S. delegates disagree over the admission of Red China and the accreditation of Hungary to the conference.

Sept. 22—McCone says that the U.S. is willing to turn four reactor facilities over to the I.A.E.A. to test its safeguard and control plan.

Sept. 24—Former Russian Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov speaks at the I.A.E.A. conference for the first time; he suggests that the agency show latitude in granting technical assistance to the newly independent states of Africa.

Sept. 27—McCone comments that conver-

sations on exchanging scientists and information with the Soviet representative were successful; these talks concerned implementation of exchange arrangements completed in 1959.

Sept. 28—A committee of the I.A.E.A. supports a 15-power resolution on atomic energy materials controls, despite Communist opposition.

Nato

Sept. 20—Land, sea and air exercises are begun in West Europe, the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The large scale maneuvers are to continue for 12 days.

Sept. 23—Diplomatic sources reveal that Nato members have agreed to a unified West European air defense command, and to other steps designed to strengthen the alliance.

United Nations (See also Congo Republic)

Sept. 8—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold asks for a reaffirmation of the policy of nonintervention in the Congo from the Security Council.

Yugoslavia asks for a meeting of the Security Council on the Congo.

Sept. 9—A Russian suggestion that the Security Council hold its next meeting on the Congo in Leopoldville is turned down 6 to 3 with 2 abstentions by the Security Council.

Sept. 12—Hammarskjold cites his opposition to a standing U.N. army.

Sept. 17—After a Tunisian-Ceylonese draft resolution reaffirming support for Hammarskjold in his Congo policy is defeated by Russian veto, an emergency session of the General Assembly is called; this is the fourth emergency session in the history of the U.N.

Sept. 19—After what he terms unfriendly treatment at the Shelbourne Hotel in New York, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro moves his entourage to a Harlem hotel. Castro is in New York for the General Assembly meetings.

Sept. 20—The 1960 session of the General Assembly convenes. Frederick H. Boland of Ireland is elected President. Russia's Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Yugoslavia's President Tito, Cuba's Castro and other important officials are present. The As-

sembly approves the admission of Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Cameroon, Togo, the Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, Malagasy Republic, Niger, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Dahomey and Cyprus.

Khrushchev calls on Castro in Castro's Harlem hotel suite.

Voting 70 to 0, the General Assembly supports Hammarskjöld's Congo policy. The Soviet bloc, France and South Africa abstain.

Sept. 21—Cameroon Foreign Minister Carles Okala asks the members of the General Assembly to avoid extending the cold war to Africa.

Sept. 22—Speaking to the General Assembly, President Eisenhower asks for negotiation and cooperation in the U.N.

Sept. 23—President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana asks the U.N. to let the independent African states handle the Congo situation; he asks support for Patrice Lumumba's government.

The Steering Committee of the General Assembly recommends that the Assembly should discuss the Hungarian question. The action is taken despite Russian disapproval.

Khrushchev asks Hammarskjöld to leave the U.N. and suggests that the U.N. should move out of the U.S. He proposes to replace the office of the Secretary General by a "collective executive body of three, representing the West, the Communist bloc and the neutralists." (See also pp. 296 ff. of this issue.)

Sept. 24—Tito and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser meet to talk about the possibility of mediating the cold war crisis. Khrushchev declares that disarmament problems cannot be solved until the problem of the Secretary Generalship is clarified.

Sept. 25—Nkrumah asks foreign powers to stay out of Africa and urges the African states to draft their own "Monroe Doctrine."

Khrushchev indicates to a news conference that his proposed 3-man U.N. directorate would give each of the three a power of veto.

Sept. 26—Castro complains to the U.N. against what he terms U.S. "aggression" against Cuba.

Sept. 27—Khrushchev suggests that India, Mexico, Indonesia, Ghana and the U.A.R. join the Disarmament Committee of the U.N.

The General Assembly's Steering Committee recommends that discussion of the seating of Communist China be postponed.

Sept. 28—Senegal and Mali are unanimously approved for U.N. membership by the General Assembly.

Sept. 29—Cambodia suggests a neutral zone to be set up by the U.N. in Southeast Asia.

Macmillan asks the General Assembly to support Hammarskjöld and suggests that the U.S.S.R. join the West in exploring ways to disarm; Khrushchev interrupts Macmillan angrily.

Khrushchev and Macmillan meet to review world tensions.

Sept. 30—President Sukarno of Indonesia and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India submit a five-power resolution asking that President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev meet as "an urgent first step" toward lessening international tensions. Ghana, the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia also sponsor this resolution.

Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah suggests a United Nations reorganization providing three deputy secretaries acceptable to the West, the Communists and the neutrals, in addition to the Secretary General, "with clearly defined authority."

Sukarno of Indonesia and the U.N. representative from Saudi Arabia both suggest moving the U.N. out of the U.S.

ALBANIA

Sept. 13—It is reported that last week two members of the Central Committee were ousted.

AUSTRIA

Sept. 21—Austria's Foreign Minister, Bruno Kreisky, asks the U.N. General Assembly to discuss the status of the German-speaking minority in South Tyrol, whose autonomy was supposed to be guaranteed by Italy.

BELGIUM

Sept. 2—Premier Gaston Eyskens announces a new coalition Cabinet drawn from the Social Christian and Liberal parties. Count Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden is chosen minister of African affairs.

Sept. 6—Following a meeting of his new Cabinet, Premier Eyskens declares that his government does not wish to interfere in the Congo Republic's internal affairs.

Sept. 13—Premier Eyskens and Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny meet for talks on European unity in Paris with French President Charles de Gaulle, Premier Michel Debré and Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

Sept. 16—Eyskens announces the betrothal of King Baudouin to Doña Fabiola de Mora y Aragon of Spain.

Ruanda-Urundi

Sept. 15—Two Urundi nationalist leaders in Geneva declare that they will ask the U.N. to send a commission to supervise the two trust territories of Ruanda-Urundi when they prepare for independence.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE

Ceylon

Sept. 12—Finance Minister Felix Dias Bandaranaike tells the House of Representatives that the Congo government of Patrice Lumumba is the only lawfully constituted government in the Congo.

Sept. 13—The 1961 fiscal budget is presented to the House of Representatives; a deficit of almost 470 million rupees (\$97 million) is prognosticated.

Sept. 15—The Finance Ministry recommends a land tax, a 15 per cent surcharge on the income tax, and a levy on foreign residents, to help meet the anticipated deficit.

Ghana

Sept. 16—It is reported in Accra that because Togo has not set up a plan for economic cooperation with Ghana, border restrictions against Togo have been increased. New regulations are effective today.

A Soviet trade showroom is opened in Accra.

Sept. 23—In New York for the meetings of the U.N. General Assembly, President Kwame Nkrumah confers with U.S. President Eisenhower and then with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

Sept. 26—Nkrumah holds a series of meetings with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, British Prime Minister

Harold Macmillan and Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.

Sept. 27—Speaking to a group of 44 Africans and Asians at a luncheon recess of the General Assembly, Nkrumah asks for the formation of a neutral bloc, "a strong third force not to be buffeted by great-power quarrels and ambitions."

Great Britain

Sept. 9—The ninety-second annual conference of the British Trades Union Congress ends with a plea for "closest unity" with the Labor party.

Sept. 25—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan arrives in the United States.

Sept. 28—The British Atomic Energy Authority reveals that plans for a giant fusion power research machine have been postponed.

An agreement concluded in Oslo allows British trawlers to fish within 6 miles of the Norwegian coast for 10 years; thereafter the limit will be set 12 miles offshore.

India

Sept. 9—The Finance Ministry reveals figures proving that India is promised some 9.040 million rupees (\$1.898 million) in foreign aid for the third five year plan. Two-thirds of the aid is pledged by the U.S.

Sept. 15—Meeting under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S., Britain, West Germany, Canada, Japan and the Netherlands plan to give India some \$136 million in exchange funds to finance imports in the last six months of the second five year plan. Agreements are tentative.

Sept. 17—It is announced by Peking that the Chinese People's Republic has rejected Indian complaints against violations of Indian airspace in the Tibetan region. The Chinese are reported to claim that the encroaching planes were American.

Sept. 19—Details of the Indus River treaty between India and Pakistan are revealed. The treaty is signed in Karachi.

Sept. 20—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan begin formal discussions in Karachi.

Sept. 23—Nehru and Ayub announce that they have worked to relieve "old emotional strains and tensions" and have agreed to

promote "friendly and cooperative" relations.

Sept. 25—Nehru arrives in New York to attend the sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.

Malaya

Sept. 12—Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman says he will not attend the U.N. General Assembly session.

Sept. 21—Putra Ibni al-Marhum Syed Hassan Jamalullail, Raja of Perlis, is named Paramount Ruler of the Federation. He is chosen unanimously by secret ballot cast by rulers of 9 states, for a 5 year term.

Pakistan

Sept. 19—The Indus River pact is signed by President Mohammad Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

Sept. 23—An official statement asserts that Afghani troops are gathering on the north-western frontier of Pakistan.

Sept. 24—President Ayub notes in a press interview that solution of the Kashmir dispute is essential to harmony between Pakistan and India.

South Africa

Sept. 12—Dr. Ambrose Reeves, Bishop of Johannesburg, is deported secretly after he returns from a five-month stay in England.

Sept. 26—David B. Pratt, would-be assassin of Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd, is declared mentally unfit to stand trial for attempted murder; he is to be committed to a mental institution.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

British Columbia

Sept. 13—A general election supports the Social Credit party with 32 seats in Parliament (an incomplete return), a loss of some 6 seats; Premier W. A. C. Bennett begins his ninth term of office.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Sept. 1—A law banning racial discrimination in restaurants, hotel dining rooms, movie theaters and cafes goes into effect in Northern Rhodesia.

Sept. 3—Northern Rhodesian police use tear gas and other strong measures to curb racial violence as hotels, theaters and restaurants are opened to all races.

Sept. 13—Commonwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys talks to Southern

Rhodesian Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead and his cabinet.

Malta

Sept. 26—The British Colonial Office announces that a British commission will go to Malta in October to discuss plans for a constitution.

Nigeria

Sept. 28—It is reported in Lagos that some 3500 tribesmen have been arrested because of inter-tribal warfare.

Sept. 29—Fourteen Africans are reported to have been killed and some 87 hurt in Northern Region rioting on the eve of independence.

Tanganyika

Sept. 2—Julius Nyerere of the National Union party is named Chief Minister after victory in the Legislative Council elections. It is announced that the appointment of John Fletcher-Cooke as Deputy Governor has been approved by Queen Elizabeth II.

Uganda

Sept. 25—The Parliament resolves that Buganda will never participate in a Uganda Legislative Council. Buganda is the largest and wealthiest of the four kingdoms of Uganda.

CHINA, NATIONALIST

Sept. 4—Lei Chen, publisher and director of *Free China* (a semi-monthly magazine), is arrested and charged with sedition. Lei is opposed to President Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang party, and has been involved in organizing a new group, the China Democratic party.

Sept. 6—It is announced that last week Nationalist China adopted a new economic law to attract foreign investment by eliminating tight restrictions on economic and business enterprises. The measure allows complete foreign ownership of a business in Nationalist China.

Sept. 12—A spokesman for the projected China Democratic party declares that the government has assured him that Lei's arrest was not due to his opposition political activities.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Sept. 29—*Hsinhua* (Chinese press agency) announces that a collection of the writings

of Chairman of the Communist party Mao Tse-tung has just been published, in which the Chinese "hard line" against the imperialist powers is affirmed. The book denies Soviet ideology proclaiming that peaceful evolution toward socialism is possible.

CONGO REPUBLIC, THE

Sept. 2—It is reported that Soviet planes with crews have been sent to Stanleyville. A Lumumba spokesman confirms the arrival of 10 Soviet Ilyushins.

Fighting is reported between Congolese troops and rebels in Bakwanga, capital of the Mining State, a portion of Kasai Province that seceded from the Congo Republic.

A Moroccan contingent of U.N. troops fires on armed Congolese civilians in self-defense, killing one.

Sept. 3—Volunteers from Katanga Province enter Kasai Province to assist secessionist Albert Kalonji, head of the Mining State, in fighting Congolese troops.

Sept. 5—President Joseph Kasavubu announces that he has removed Premier Patrice Lumumba and that he has named Joseph Ileo to the premiership. Kasavubu asks the United Nations to assure law and order in the Congo. In a later broadcast Lumumba challenges Kasavubu's action as "illegal"; he asks the Congo Army to continue to support him.

Sept. 6—Police disperse pro-Kasavubu demonstrators in Leopoldville. Premier Lumumba continues in his post; he calls his cabinet into session and declares Kasavubu relieved of his presidential duties.

Sept. 7—The Chamber, lower house of parliament, votes to invalidate both the President's and the Premier's dismissals of one another.

Sept. 8—Premier Lumumba receives a 41-2 vote of confidence in the Congo Senate, which thus rejects Lumumba's dismissal by Kasavubu. Lumumba declares that he will ask U.N. forces to leave unless they give up control of the nation's airports and radio stations.

U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld asks Belgium whether or not it has sent nine tons of weapons to Katanga

Province, in violation of the Security Council resolution of July 22, 1960.

Yugoslavia asks for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the Congo situation.

Sept. 9—The U.N. mission to the Congo announces that Congo Army troops have agreed to a cease-fire along the Katanga Province border, where a U.N. truce supervisory commission will begin operations tomorrow. Premier Lumumba later denies that a cease-fire has been ordered, and declares that the Congo army will continue to act in Katanga Province.

The Soviet Union asks the Security Council to order its U.N. forces to relinquish control over airports and radio stations.

Premier Moise Tshombe of Katanga asks for a meeting of Congolese leaders to discuss transforming the centralized government, favored by Lumumba, into a loose confederation.

Guinean General Lansana Diane, leader of his nation's forces under the U.N. command in the Congo, declares that Guinea should withdraw its troops from U.N. control.

Yesterday, Guinean President Sekou Touré, in Moscow, declared that he would support Soviet steps in the U.N. to rid the Congo of "aggressive forces."

Katanga police move in on U.N.-controlled air bases at Elisabethville, Kamina and Kongolo; two planes take off from Elisabethville, refuel at the Kamina airfield, and land at Kongolo. Authorities in secessionist Katanga province state that the reason for their defiance of the U.N. ban on air travel is that 300 Congo Army troops entered Katanga yesterday.

Belgium announces that all arms shipments to the Congo have been stopped.

The Soviet Union tells the U.N. Security Council to halt interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, and to support the Lumumba government.

Sept. 10—*Tass* announces that a Soviet note has been sent to Secretary General Hammarskjöld, affirming that the U.S.S.R. will assist the Congo government if it so desires.

The U.S.S.R. asks the Security Council to withdraw U.N. control over Congo airfields and radio stations.

Sept. 11—Kasavubu and Lumumba send 2

separate Congo delegations to attend the U.N. Security Council debate on the Congo situation.

Premier Lumumba is rebuffed by U.N. Ghanaian troops when he tries to take over the Leopoldville radio station.

Sept. 12—Premier Lumumba is arrested by Congo Army troops. By evening he is in a private house guarded by Congolese and U.N. troops; it is not known whether or not he is under arrest. Premier-Designate Joseph Ileo declares that Lumumba is under arrest.

President Kasavubu asks the U.N. to help re-train the Congo Army. He also asks for U.N. protection for talks that he has called with secessionist leaders, Moise Tshombe of Katanga and Albert Kalonji of Kasai.

The U.A.R. orders its troop contingent under U.N. command in the Congo home in disapproval of U.N. control over Leopoldville's airport and radio stations.

Sept. 13—In a note from the Soviet Union to the Security Council, it is charged that Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld "personally" obstructs a settlement of the Congo crisis.

Ghana declares that it reserves the right to remove its troops from the U.N. command and place them at the service of Premier Lumumba.

The U.N. lifts its ban on all the Congo airfields, opening them to "peaceful traffic," and relinquishes control over the Leopoldville radio stations.

In a joint session of both houses of parliament, Lumumba is voted "special powers."

Sept. 14—Colonel Joseph Mobuto, Chief of Staff of the Congo Army, announces that the army has taken control of the government through January 1, 1961.

The Security Council refuses to recognize either of the two delegations representing opposing Congolese leaders Kasavubu and Lumumba.

The Soviet delegation launches a severe attack on Hammarskjöld's handling of the Congo situation, and terms him a "tool" of the West.

Sept. 15—U.S. representative to the U.N. James J. Wadsworth affirms U.S. confidence in Hammarskjöld.

The U.S.S.R. introduces a resolution

into the Security Council demanding that U.N. interference in Congolese internal affairs stop, that a new military force, working in closer cooperation with Lumumba, be established, and that financial aid be directly given to the Congo government.

Premier Moise Tshombe of Katanga Province, signs an agreement with Premier Joseph Ileo pledging support of President Kasavubu. The agreement was signed in Brazzaville, Congo of the Republic (a former French colony).

Sept. 16—Kasavubu and Ileo order the withdrawal of the Soviet and Czech embassy delegations within 48 hours.

Soviet and Czech ambassadors leave the Congo. It is reported that Lumumba has disappeared.

Ceylon and Tunisia introduce a compromise resolution before the Security Council as an alternative to the Soviet and U.S. resolutions up for consideration. The Ceylon-Tunisian resolution upholds support for Hammarskjöld and urges that the U.N. should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo. It should only act "in consultation with the central government."

Premier Tshombe of Katanga declares that the U.N. forces sent to preserve order in his secessionist state have failed.

Sept. 17—The Soviet Union vetoes the Tunisian-Ceylonese draft resolution compromise, which reaffirmed support of Secretary General Hammarskjöld.

Sept. 18—Patrice Lumumba reappears at his residence after a 48-hour disappearance.

Congo Army troops begin evacuation of Katanga Province and South Kasai (Mining State).

The U.S.S.R. announces that it will continue relations with the Congo Republic even though Lumumba's government (recognized as the legal power by Moscow) has been ousted.

Sept. 19—Sixteen Asian-African nations in the U.N. present before a special emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly a draft resolution urging Hammarskjöld to take "vigorous action" in settling the Congo crisis.

It is announced by Information Minister Jean Bolikango that President Kasa-

vubu plans a coalition government composed of Lumumba, Kalonji, Tshombe and Mobutu.

Sept. 20—A College of High Commissioners—composed of university graduates and students—is appointed to govern the Congo.

Sept. 21—Hammarskjold warns Tshombe that U.N. forces will be used to protect civilians from police repression. This action was provoked because Katanga policemen were used against Baluba tribesmen opposing Tshombe.

Colonel Mobutu discloses that he has asked the U.N. force to withdraw Ghana and Guinea troop contingents from the Congo.

Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah states that Lumumba is the legal head of the Congo government.

Sept. 22—Congo Army soldiers in the military garrison at Leopoldville mutiny briefly over reports that officers' salaries have been increased to 10 times that of the soldiers.

Sept. 26—Answering Soviet charges against his handling of the Congo situation, Secretary General Hammarskjold tells the U.N. General Assembly that he will pursue his policy of "independence, impartiality, objectivity" towards the Congo.

Sept. 26—Two government officials, the High Commissioner and Deputy High Commissioner of the Interior, are assaulted, reportedly by civilian supporters of Lumumba.

Rajeshwar Dayal, successor to Ralph Bunche as head of the U.N. command in the Congo, issues his first report to Hammarskjold, in which he warns that reconciliation among opposition groups must be effected.

Sept. 27—Colonel Mobutu issues a plea for roundtable talks with Congolese leaders to work out differences between Kasavubu and Lumumba.

Sept. 29—Kasavubu announces that he has placed "executive and administrative authority" in the country in the hands of the College of High Commissioners. Premier-designate Ileo's authority is thus superseded until normalcy can be established. Lumumba is the only remaining rival for government powers.

Sept. 30—Colonel Joseph Mobutu discloses

that he has a letter from Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to Premier Lumumba, in which the Red Chinese leader made a \$2.5 million aid offer, but refused an appeal for volunteers.

CUBA

Sept. 1—Premier Fidel Castro's government confiscates 3 American rubber companies in Cuba: the Firestone, Goodyear and U.S. Rubber companies.

Sept. 2—Castro tells cheering crowds in Havana that Cuba will recognize Red China. He abrogates the 21-nation mutual defense hemispheric pact of 1947. Castro denounces the Declaration of San José, adopted at the recent meeting of O.A.S. ministers, which condemns acceptance of any extra-continental interference by any Latin American state.

Sept. 4—Following Castro's announcement earlier this week, it is reported that yesterday the government of Nationalist China informed Cuba that diplomatic relations have been severed.

Sept. 7—At the economic meeting of Latin American states in Bogota, Colombia, Cuba's Economics Minister Regino Boti criticizes the U.S. plan for a \$500 million assistance fund for Latin America.

Sept. 13—It is announced that Fidel Castro will lead his delegation at the opening of the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Sept. 17—Three U.S. banks, with total assets estimated at \$35-\$40 million, are nationalized by order of Premier Castro and President Osvaldo Dorticos. U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Philip W. Bonsal is ordered restricted to a 10-mile area in Havana.

Sept. 18—Castro arrives in New York for the opening of the General Assembly.

Sept. 24—Cuba's government issues a decree extending formal recognition to Red China.

Sept. 25—Castro confers with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Sept. 28—Castro returns to Cuba and strongly criticizes the U.S. for its Guantamo base.

Sept. 29—The U.S. State Department discloses that it has officially advised citizens in Cuba (other than those at Guantamo) to send their families to the U.S.

Sept. 30—The U.S. State Department advises all its citizens against entering Cuba on any matter "unless there are compelling reasons for such travel."

Colombian Foreign Minister Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala tells the General Assembly that Latin America will not brook any extra-continental intervention in its affairs. He rejects the Cuban contention that extra-continental protection is necessary.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Sept. 1—Repudiating a popular campaign to draft him for the presidency, Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina declares that if needed, he will agree to become president. He affirms his support of President Joaquin Balaguer.

Sept. 5—Soviet Delegate to the U.N. Vasily V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., requests a meeting of the Security Council to discuss Dominican aggression and interference against Venezuela.

FINLAND

Sept. 2—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev arrives in Finland for the celebration of Finnish President Urho Kekkonen's sixtieth birthday tomorrow.

Sept. 4—Khrushchev and Kekkonen issue a joint communiqué announcing that the Finnish President will visit Moscow in November to work out a trade agreement with the Soviet Union enabling Finland to become an associate member of the European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven).

FRANCE

Sept. 1—France and Morocco issue a joint announcement that France will evacuate its Moroccan bases by March, 1961, and its air training centers by 1963.

Sept. 3—French President Charles de Gaulle talks with Italy's Premier Amintore Fanfani and Foreign Minister Antonio Segni on his idea for European confederation.

Sept. 5—De Gaulle, in his third press conference since assuming the presidency, proposes a referendum in the Common Market countries to gain popular support for unifying Europe along the lines of a federation of sovereign states.

Sept. 17—Completing a round of meetings, beginning last July, with members of the

Inner Six (the Common Market nations of West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Luxembourg), de Gaulle discusses closer European political unity with Luxembourg's Premier Pierre Werner and Foreign Minister Eugene Schaus.

Sept. 22—General Raoul Salan, one of the leaders in the 1958 Algerian revolt that returned de Gaulle to power, is forbidden to return to Algeria because of his opposition to de Gaulle's policy to allow the Algerians to choose their own fate, i.e., secession, assimilation or association.

Sept. 26—In line with her action two days ago easing import regulations on goods from the dollar area and O.E.E.C. countries, France drops import bans on Gatt nations outside the dollar area and the O.E.E.C.

Sept. 27—The Cabinet agrees, at the request of Premier Michel Debré, to penalize French citizens who advocate "refusal of military service or desertion." The 140 artists, writers and intellectuals who signed a manifesto recently upholding the right to refuse military service in Algeria are prohibited from working on state-supported radio and television stations or state theaters.

Sept. 29—The French government discloses its budget for 1961, which is geared to an economic expansion program of 5.5 per cent for the coming year.

Sept. 30—It is reported by an official source that France plans no change in its policy, as set forth by de Gaulle, of maintaining complete aloofness from U.N. activities.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Sept. 18—Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai sends a message to the Algerian provisional government in exile in commemoration of the second anniversary of the founding of the rebel government.

Sept. 20—The first of four planned commissions begins a study of Algerian agricultural and rural problems; the commission is composed of Muslim and European Algerians.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY

Malagasy

Sept. 4—Voters go to the polls to elect a 107-

member lower house. They vote again in a month for the Senate.

Sept. 7—Incomplete returns give the Social Democrat party headed by President Philibert Tsirana a majority of 75 seats.

Republic of Mali

(See also *International, United Nations.*)

Sept. 23—The Republic of Sudan withdraws from the French Community; it is renamed the Republic of Mali. This unanimous action by the parliament in effect recognizes the demise of the former Mali republic, composed of Senegal and Sudan, which broke up on August 20.

Sept. 24—The U.S. announces that it formally recognizes the new Republic of Mali.

Mauritania

Sept. 29—It is announced that Mauritania has arrested four persons advocating union with Morocco.

Republic of Senegal

(See also *International, United Nations.*)

Sept. 5—The electoral college unanimously chooses Leopold S. Senghor as the first president of the republic.

Sept. 11—France extends official recognition.

Sept. 24—The U.S. formally recognizes the Republic of Senegal.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (WEST)

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

Sept. 22—Finance Minister Franz Etzel presents an unprecedented federal budget—the equivalent of \$10.7 billion—for 1961 to the parliament for its approval.

Sept. 26—Following an 11-month inquiry, the district attorney's office announces that no evidence has been found to prove that Theodor Oberlaender, ex-minister for refugee affairs, was involved in a 1941 Nazi massacre of Polish Jews. The matter is dropped without bringing an indictment against Oberlaender.

GERMANY, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (EAST)

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

Sept. 7—East German President Wilhelm Pieck dies of a heart attack.

Sept. 12—Parliament establishes a new Council of State, which will be East Ger-

many's supreme organ of government. The office of president is abolished. Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the Socialist Unity (Communist) party, is named chairman of the Council.

GUINEA

Sept. 10—President Sekou Touré arrives in Red China on a visit of state.

Sept. 13—Guinea and Red China sign a treaty of friendship providing for trade and economic and technical cooperation. Red China will lend over a 3-year period 100 million rubles (\$25 million) to Guinea.

HONDURAS

Sept. 15—The International Court of Justice hears argument open on a case involving a border dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras.

HUNGARY

Sept. 25—First Secretary of the Communist party Janos Kadar, heading his country's delegation to the U.N. General Assembly, tours New York City.

INDONESIA

Sept. 5—President Sukarno will attend the opening of the U.N. General Assembly.

Sept. 13—A ban is ordered on all political bodies through November 30 by the President, except for such "government backed" groups as Sukarno's National Front.

Sept. 14—The anti-Communist Masjumi party, representing the Muslim group, announces that it is dissolving itself in accord with Sukarno's decree.

Sept. 25—By order of Sukarno, six printing plants are seized, thus interrupting the publication of 8 opposition and anti-Communist newspapers.

IRAN

Sept. 1—At the request of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, newly elected deputies to the lower house of parliament resign to permit new elections to be held.

Sept. 3—Yadullah Azodi is named foreign minister by the new premier, Jafar Sharif Imami.

Sept. 22—It is reported that the U.S.S.R. has offered economic aid to Iran if it will not allow the U.S. to use any of its bases for an attack on the U.S.S.R.

ISRAEL

Sept. 29—An Israeli report names 23 persons presently in the U.A.R., who are former Nazis or who collaborated with them.

JAPAN

Sept. 22—Crown Prince Akihito and Princess Michiko arrive in the U.S. for a 16-day good will visit.

Sept. 27—President Eisenhower presides at a dinner in honor of the royal couple.

JORDAN

Sept. 1—It is announced that the Secretary General of the Arab League, Abdel Khalik Hassouna, will investigate the U.A.R.-Jordan quarrel over the slaying of Jordanian Premier Hazza Majali.

Sept. 6—King Hussein accuses the U.A.R. and President Nasser of complicity in the assassination of Majali.

KOREA, SOUTH

Sept. 8—The Cabinet threatens to resign following intra-party friction between conservative and liberal elements of the ruling Democratic party. Conservatives feel they have been left out.

Sept. 12—Cabinet changes are announced; four Cabinet posts are given to the conservative, older faction of the Democratic party.

LAOS

Sept. 1—Captain Kong Le, leader of the August 9 coup, declares that he accepts the coalition Cabinet formed by Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Sept. 2—The new, neutralist Cabinet headed by Premier Phouma takes office.

Sept. 4—*Hsinhua* (Communist China's press agency) reports that Pathet Lao rebels will only settle their differences with the new Laotian government if four conditions are met, including the demand for the dismissal of all pro-Western Cabinet ministers held over from ex-Premier Tiao Somsanith's government.

Sept. 11—A state of emergency is decreed in Laos. Prince Boun Oum, leader of the revolt, announces that he will take over the country. He sharply condemns the neutralist Cabinet of Premier Phouma.

Sept. 13—The revolutionary committee, set up by Boun Oum, in Savannakhet, agrees to meet with Phouma's Cabinet to nego-

tiate a settlement. The invitation was issued by King Savang Vathana.

Sept. 17—General Phoumi Nosavan, deputy premier and minister of the interior under Phouma, who is supporting Prince Boun Oum's revolt, announces that 6 battalions of Communist troops have entered Laos from North Vietnam.

Sept. 21—Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that in two battles yesterday government troops halted the march of the Revolutionary Committee of Savannakhet forces on Vientiane.

Sept. 22—Laotian troops retake the city of Paksane from rebels under the command of the pro-Western General Phoumi Nosavan.

Sept. 26—It is disclosed that the regional commander in Samneua has reported severe fighting between his troops and Pathet Lao rebels.

Sept. 28—King Savang Vathana holds talks with General Nosavan and General Ouane Rathikone, leader of the Laotian army, on settling the revolt.

Sept. 30—Captain Kong Le refuses to obey a cease-fire and declares that he will continue to fight General Phoumi Nosavan's forces.

Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that his government is seeking to establish diplomatic ties with the U.S.S.R.

MOROCCO

Sept. 6—A press law outlawing criticism of the government is promulgated.

Sept. 16—Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, before his departure to attend the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, says that he opposes independence for Mauritania. Hassan will press Morocco's claim to Mauritania before the U.N.

PANAMA

Sept. 17—U.S. President Eisenhower orders that the Panama flag be flown with the U.S. flag over the canal zone.

PERU

Sept. 4—The government of Premier Pedro G. Beltran receives a vote of confidence on his policies in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

POLAND

Sept. 4—First Secretary of the Communist party Wladyslaw Gomulka charges that

Polish farmers have not cooperated in joining farm "circles"—voluntary associations for collective purchase of farm machinery. He blames Polish farmers for failing to meet production goals.

RUMANIA

Sept. 30—First Secretary of the Rumanian Communist party Gheorge Gheorghiu-dej declares that he still thinks it possible to create a neutral buffer zone in the Balkans composed of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

SAN SALVADOR

Sept. 6—It is announced that last night the Legislative Assembly declared a 30-day state of seige for the country.

A communique discloses that riots last week, culminating in an attack on the fifth regiment barracks in Santa Ana, have been broken up.

SWEDEN

Sept. 18—Elections to the 232-member lower house are held. Premier Tage Erlander's Social Democratic government gains 5 seats for a total of 116; the Conservatives lose 9 seats, winning 36.

TURKEY

Sept. 29—The Democratic party, which ruled Turkey under the leadership of ex-Premier Adnan Menderes and others from 1950 through the May 27, 1960 revolution, is declared abolished in a civil court decision.

U.S.S.R., THE

Sept. 1—It is announced that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev will head the Soviet delegation at the opening of the fifteenth session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Sept. 3—Khrushchev, visiting Finland, lambasts the West's role in the cold war.

Sept. 13—The Soviet Union protests the U.S. State Department restrictions limiting Khrushchev to Manhattan island during his visit to the U.N.

Sept. 16—Naval Captain Nikolai Federovich Artamonov, who defected to the West in 1959, reveals that the U.S.S.R. possesses nuclear submarines.

Sept. 18—In anticipation of Khrushchev's arrival in New York tomorrow, 2,000

people stage a protest demonstration in front of the Soviet headquarters for U.N. personnel.

Sept. 19—The *Baltika*, with Khrushchev aboard, docks in New York harbor amid anti-Khrushchev displays.

Sept. 24—Valerian A. Zorin is named permanent representative to the U.N.

Sept. 27—It is announced that the U.S.S.R. has accepted an invitation to participate in the New York World's Fair in 1964–1965.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Sept. 16—It is announced that a \$22.5 million loan to the U.A.R. has been granted by the Export-Import Bank.

Sept. 20—President Gamal Abdel Nasser reorganizes his Cabinet; however, no new ministers are named.

Sept. 23—President Nasser arrives in New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly session.

Sept. 24—Nasser meets with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia at the U.N. It is reported that the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia are attempting to form a unified neutralist bloc.

Sept. 27—Nasser addresses the General Assembly; he calls for a meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Sept. 9—Clarence M. Ferguson is appointed to succeed Elvin L. Peterson as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture.

The Department of Agriculture issues a September crop report predicting record harvests for 1960.

Civil Rights

Sept. 13—The U.S. Department of Justice brings suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 against 27 persons and 2 banks in Haywood County, Tennessee, charging that economic pressure has been brought to bear to keep Negroes from voting.

Sept. 23—Registrars in Terrell County, Georgia, promise full compliance with a federal court order to end discriminatory practices that keep Negroes from the polls.

Foreign Policy (See also *International, U.N.*)

Sept. 6—It is revealed in Moscow that two Americans have defected from the United States National Security Agency. William

H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell reveal that they have adopted Russian citizenship because of their opposition to U.S. intelligence methods.

Sept. 7—President Dwight D. Eisenhower suggests that the U.S.S.R. should stop sending military supplies to the Congo in support of Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba.

Sept. 8—Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson Jr. asks Khrushchev in Moscow to release the imprisoned crewmen of a U.S. reconnaissance plane shot down July 1.

Sept. 10—The U.S. reveals that for security reasons Khrushchev will be restricted to Manhattan Island when he visits the U.N.

Sept. 14—The U.S. notifies Cuba that Premier Fidel Castro will be limited to Manhattan when he visits the U.N.

U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter disagrees with French President Charles de Gaulle's recommendations for changes in Nato.

Sept. 16—John F. Kennedy, Democratic presidential candidate, explains in a televised talk that Democratic criticisms of administration policy are not evidence of national disunity.

Sept. 26—In private conversations, Nehru and Nasser indicate to President Eisenhower that they will oppose Khrushchev's plan for a 3-man directorate at the U.N.

Sept. 27—The U.S. offers "assistance in all fields" to Mali.

Sept. 30—It is announced by the White House office that the President will confer with British Prime Minister Macmillan and with Australian Prime Minister Menzies in Washington on October 2.

The State Department suggests that United States citizens avoid visits to Cuba "unless there are compelling reasons" for travel there; following advice given yesterday to some four thousand American citizens in Cuba to send their wives, children and other dependents home.

New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller arrives in Lagos, Nigeria, for the celebration of Nigerian independence October 1. Rockefeller is the President's personal representative.

Government

Sept. 1—The Eighty-sixth Congress adjourns after a post-convention session. Congress-

sional failure to act on a bill permitting Eisenhower to refuse to buy Dominican sugar is termed "extremely serious" by the President.

Sept. 2—President Eisenhower signs a \$3.787 billion appropriation for military and economic foreign aid in fiscal 1961. The appropriation falls \$500 million short of the President's original request. He vetoes legislation providing federal subsidies to small lead and zinc producers.

Sept. 6—A U.S. Court of Appeals upholds a Federal Judge ruling that the courts cannot enjoin the Senate Internal Security subcommittee from asking Nobel Prize winning biochemist Linus Pauling to disclose the names of those who helped him circulate a petition to the U.N. denouncing nuclear tests.

Sept. 9—Eisenhower signs a measure providing for a special Latin American aid program providing \$65 million in additional foreign aid.

Sept. 13—Eisenhower signs a bill aimed at improving medical care for the indigent aged and expanding coverage of old-age Social Security benefits. Federal aid will be given to the states to help those now on old-age relief rolls and additional needy persons, not receiving relief payments.

Sept. 14—George W. Abbott is named Assistant Secretary of the Interior, succeeding Roger Ernst.

Sept. 24—A survey by *Congressional Quarterly* reveals that the National Education Association spent more than any other pressure group in support of legislation considered by Congress in the first half of 1960. The next largest spender was the AFL-CIO; third was the Teamsters Union organization. A total of 255 pressure groups reported that they spent \$1.8 million in the first six months of 1960.

Sept. 30—Controller General Joseph Campbell reveals that at least \$151.5 million of the 1960 budget surplus resulted from deliberate delay of a single day in expense payments in the Pentagon. Army and Air Force allotment checks were dated July 1, thus charging them in the 1961 fiscal year.

Labor

Sept. 1—For the first time in its 114 years, the Pennsylvania Railroad suspends service; a strike of maintenance employees is

responsible. The Transport Workers Union and System Federation 152, representing 20,000 non-operating employees, are asking for a stricter job classification set-up; they also object to the railroad's practice of "farming out" work to outside contractors.

Sept. 12—A compromise contract ends the Pennsylvania Railroad strike.

Sept. 21—After a fracas at the United Steelworkers' annual convention, Donald C. Rarick asks Labor Secretary James P. Mitchell to investigate his charges that terrorism prevailed at the meetings. Rarick leads the opposition to the union executives.

Military

Sept. 2—In a training accident, 15 U.S. soldiers are killed and 28 are injured when a howitzer shell explodes in a tent camp in West Germany.

Sept. 6—General Clyde D. Eddleman is named Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, to succeed General George H. Decker who has been confirmed as Army Chief of Staff.

The Atomic Energy Commission announces that radiation exposure limits for atomic industrial plants have been reduced to one-third the former limit; the general public's exposure limit is correspondingly lowered.

Sept. 14—In Washington, a naval spokesman reveals plans to send a carrier-based naval force, including 1,100 marines, to the South China Sea.

Sept. 19—A DC6-B crashes in Guam; 77 members of the military and their dependents are killed.

Sept. 21—A Blue Scout Junior rocket to be used to detect high altitude nuclear explosions is fired by the Air Force.

Sept. 22—Twenty-nine marines are killed when their plane crashes off Okinawa.

The Navy reports that one and possibly two submarines have been seen near a Russian tanker and tug some 400 miles east of Newfoundland.

Sept. 24—The atomic-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, largest ship ever built, is launched at Newport News, Virginia.

Sept. 25—The Air Force fails in its fifth try to place a rocket into orbit around the moon.

Sept. 30—General Lyman L. Lemnitzer is sworn in as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, succeeding the retiring General Nathan F. Twining.

The Department of Defense announces that it is adding \$107 million to the Polaris submarine missile program and \$33.8 million to the Samos reconnaissance satellite development program, thus using funds originally termed unnecessary by the President.

Politics

Sept. 1—Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy promises to support congressional passage of the Democratic civil rights platform early next year.

Sept. 5—Former Governor of Louisiana Earl K. Long dies of a heart attack.

Sept. 7—Vice President Richard Nixon suggests that a system of independent graduate institutions be set up by the federal government for basic scientific research.

President Eisenhower criticizes those who inject the religious issue into the presidential campaign.

The National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom, a Protestant group led by Norman Vincent Peale, issues a statement charging that a Catholic President would feel "extreme pressure from the hierarchy of his church" to make U.S. foreign policy conform to the policies of the Vatican.

Sept. 9—Vice President Nixon is discharged from the hospital after a 12-day stay for treatment of a knee infection.

Sept. 12—Kennedy tells a television audience in Texas that if he could not make all decisions "without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates" he would resign as President.

Sept. 11—Opposition to "all attempts to make religious affiliation the basis of the voter's choice of candidates for public office" is voiced in a statement signed by one hundred churchmen and scholars.

Sept. 13—Nixon urges voters to accept Kennedy's pledge that religion would not influence him in public office.

Sept. 15—The Rev. Norman Vincent Peale resigns from the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom.

John C. Bennett, dean of the faculty at Union Theological Seminary, and Rein-

hold Niebuhr, accuse Norman Vincent Peale and two organizations advocating church-state separation of loosing "the floodgates of religious bigotry."

Sept. 16—Nixon outlines the first half of a "massive program" for solving the farm problem in a speech at Des Moines, Iowa; he suggests a multi-million dollar program to reduce farm surpluses to "manageable proportions" in the next four years.

Sept. 20—Nixon suggests that a campaign truce be declared on suggestions that the U.S. is weak, because he feels such suggestions may give encouragement to Khrushchev.

The Texas Democratic Convention repudiates the Democratic national platform and writes its own; support is nevertheless pledged to Kennedy and Johnson.

Kennedy promises that he will act to strengthen the U.S. role in world affairs in his "first ninety days" as President.

Sept. 21—Nixon terms Kennedy the spokesman of "national self-disparagement."

Kennedy rejects Nixon's suggestion for a truce on talk of Administration weakness during Khrushchev's visit.

Sept. 22—Kennedy promises farmers a six-point marketing control program aimed at "full parity of income" for farm families suggesting that "supply management" will prove effective.

Sept. 23—Nixon tells farmers that a stiff control program is only the necessary first step toward freeing the farmer from government controls.

Sept. 26—Nixon and Kennedy exchange views in a nationally televised debate, the first of a series of televised debates between the two candidates.

Sept. 27—Ten Democratic Southern governors wire Kennedy their congratulations on his television debate.

Sept. 29—At a Republican victory fund dinner, Eisenhower supports the Nixon-Lodge ticket, and praises Nixon's experience.

Segregation

Sept. 3—The Southern Education Reporting Service reveals that 17 additional southern school districts will desegregate in 1960-1961.

Sept. 6—School integration starts in Rich-

mond, Virginia; at least nine other Virginia localities proceed with integration.

Sept. 8—A one-grade-a-year integration program opens in Houston, Texas.

Sept. 9—Because of a Federal Court order that Oldtown District (Virginia) Negroes will have to be admitted to Galax High School since the school admits Oldtown white students, the 285 Oldtown white students are ordered to leave Galax High School immediately.

Sept. 12—The Galax, Virginia, school board reconsiders its decision of September 9 and agrees to admit the Oldtown Negro and white students.

Sept. 15—A Negro principal of a New Rochelle, New York, elementary school refuses to admit 13 Negro children from another school district.

Sept. 17—It is revealed in Farmville, Virginia, that public schools will not open this year; Prince Edward County refuses to integrate schools.

Sept. 26—A temporary injunction forbids an attempted sit down protest at a predominantly white elementary school in New Rochelle.

Supreme Court

Sept. 1—The Court rules unanimously to refuse to grant stays of lower court orders calling for integration in Houston, New Orleans, and in Delaware.

VATICAN

Sept. 1—The code of rubrics, which outlines the order of procedure for the Roman Catholic mass and other rites, is revised and abbreviated. The breviary and the missal are both shortened.

YUGOSLAVIA

Sept. 16—The U.S. Development Loan Fund agrees to lend Yugoslavia \$23 million.

Sept. 20—Yugoslav President Tito arrives in New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly session.

Sept. 28—After meeting with Tito at the United Nations for almost two hours, Soviet Premier Khrushchev says that the two leaders are in agreement on many crucial questions.

These **CURRENT HISTORY** issues are available for quantity purchase

Use this check list to order for your classes . . .

Problems in World Affairs

- Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (9/57)
- The World of Islam (6/57)
- France in Africa (2/58)
- West Europe Today and Tomorrow (11/56)
- France's Foreign Policy (5/55)
- Report on Germany (4/56)
- Canada (7/55)
- The Mediterranean World (8/55)
- Great Britain: Education at Mid-Century (9/58)
- The Far East in the Free World (7/56)
- Tensions in the British Community (6/58)
- The Soviet Union since Stalin (1/56)
- Problems of American Foreign Policy (3/56)
- India Between East and West (3/59)
- Tensions in East-Central Europe (4/59)
- France and the Fifth Republic (5/59)
- New States of Africa (7/59)
- Government and Labor Abroad (8/59)
- American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- Russian Foreign Policy and the Western World (11/59)
- Communist China as a World Power (12/59)
- West Germany as a World Power (1/60)
- Latin America in Revolution (3/60)

- U. S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)
- Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- World Federalism and Free World Security (8/60)
- Nato and Free World Security (9/60)
- Russia and Continuing Coexistence (11/60)
- China and Continuing Coexistence (coming 12/60)
- West Europe and Continuing Coexistence (coming 1/61)
- Africa (coming 2/61)

Problems of American Democracy

- United States Through Foreign Eyes (12/56)
- Dilemma of Empire (12/55)
- American Farm Leaders (6/55)
- Disarmament and Defense (10/57)
- Changing American Politics (8/56)
- Public Power in the U. S. (5/58)
- Integration: The South's Historic Problem (5/57)
- Education in Crisis (9/55)
- Security in a Free Society (10/55)
- Immigration and the American Ideal (11/55)
- Government and Labor in the U. S. (9/59)
- The American Economy (7/60)
- The American Presidency in the Last Half Century (10/60)

Our Special Group Rates . . .

Because these studies are so helpful, we are now offering them at special reduced rates for group use:

In orders of 5 or more copies of different issues, copies are available at 65¢ each; in orders of 5 or more copies of the same issue, at 50¢ each; 10 or more of the same issue, at 35 cents; 30 or more of the same issue, at 30¢ each; 100 or more of the same issue, at 25¢ a copy. Single copy price, 85¢. Special discounts on orders over 200.

We also offer reduced rates for student subscriptions: in orders of 10 subscriptions or more, your students may subscribe for 9 months at \$3.15; or for 12 months at \$4.20; in orders of 30 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.70; 12 months, \$3.60; in orders of 100 or more, our 9 month rate is \$2.25 and our 12 month rate is \$3.00. The cost of a single subscription is \$5.25 for 9 months; \$7.00 a year. See our special introductory offer on reverse side.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia 3, Penna.

CH 1160-3

I understand that I may order copies of these coordinated issues in quantity at special reduced rates. Please send me the issues I have indicated, in the quantities I have marked.

Name ☐ Check enclosed ☐ Bill me
 Address ☐ 1 Year \$7 ☐ 2 Years \$13
 City State plus 3 free issues plus 3 free issues

Keep Up To Date!

See what a **CURRENT HISTORY** subscription offers **YOU!**

****Month after month, our timely studies will keep you informed on vital topics.**

INTERESTING and KNOWLEDGEABLE REPORTS will round out your background information on such crucial matters as . . .

**FREE WORLD SECURITY
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOREIGN
POLICY**

**RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
THE COLD WAR*
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
WEST GERMANY AS A WORLD
POWER**

Subscribe now to **CURRENT HISTORY**. **EXCLUSIVE AND ORIGINAL STUDIES** will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy. Nowhere is such material duplicated. Nowhere are similar studies available at such low cost. **CURRENT HISTORY's** continuing reference volumes are *one-of-a-kind!*

COORDINATED ISSUES contain seven or eight articles each month devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our contributors is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge, background, impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different aspect of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of today's world.

CHRONOLOGY — The Month in Review offers a day-by-day account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

DOCUMENTS — Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOK REVIEWS — Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the field of history and politics.

AS A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS, we will give you 3 free issues. Today, as Americans travel throughout the world, their need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundred-fold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

* Become acquainted with our continuing 3-issue series on **THE COLD WAR** — with 3 issues on Russia, China (November, December, 1960) and West Europe (scheduled for January 1961).

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to **CURRENT HISTORY** will include three coordinated studies **FREE**—Chosen from our List of Available Issues (see reverse side)—plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your 3 free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover!

A GIFT FOR YOU WORTH \$2.55 Sign up today!

From **CURRENT HISTORY** • 1822 Ludlow Street • Phila. 3, Pa.

Name Address

City Zone State

Send me the following 3 gift copies:

☐ 12 months at \$7 plus 3 free issues ☐ 24 months at \$13 plus 3 free issues ☐ Bill me
☐ Check enclosed

Add 25¢ for Canada; 75¢ for foreign, including the Philippines.

CH 1160-4